

# Perceptions of Welfare Migration in Scandinavia

*– A Symptom of the Challenge Posed by the  
EU*

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Master's thesis, Department of Political Science,  
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# Abstract

For over a decade, welfare migration<sup>1</sup> has been a much discussed topic in Europe. Since the 2004 enlargement of the EU, there has been widespread concern in the “old” member states that their relatively more extensive welfare systems are attracting migrants from the “new” and poorer member states. These concerns must be viewed in light of the challenge that the EU and EU citizenship – which provides EU citizens with the right to move and reside freely within the EU/EEA – pose to national citizenship, national institutions and national sovereignty.

An interesting aspect of the discussion on welfare migration is that there is uncertainty among researchers whether welfare actually *is* a determinant of migration within the EU/EEA. And if there is an effect, they argue, it is negligible. Regardless of whether welfare attracts migrants or not, perceptions of welfare migration (like all assumptions) have the potential to influence policy. While many studies have attempted to measure the effect of so-called welfare magnets, there has been little research on what constitutes different perceptions of welfare migration, and how these perceptions are expressed. This study sets out to investigate the following question:

*Which perceptions of welfare migration, within the context of the EU/EEA, exist and dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark?*

The analysis reveals that there exists a scale related to the problem definition of welfare migration. At one end of the scale, welfare migration is indeed considered a challenge to national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the other end of the scale, welfare migration is not considered a problem at all. Rather, labor migration within the EU/EEA is seen as problematic because it threatens workers’ rights and leads to social dumping.

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<sup>1</sup> Defined as *the choice to migrate to a country based on the generosity of that country’s welfare system*.



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I take full responsibility for any mistakes or omissions in this thesis.

Kjersti Varpe Nørgaard

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# List of Abbreviations

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

EC: European Commission

ECJ: European Court of Justice

EEA: European Economic Area

EFTA: European Free Trade Association

EMU: Economic and Monetary Union

EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

JHA: Justice and Home Affairs

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

TEU: Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of Rome)

UBS: Unemployment Benefit Spending

# List of Party Name Translations

Norway:

Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV) – The Socialist Left Party

Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) – The Labour Party

Senterpartiet (Sp) – The Centre Party

Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) – The Christian Democratic Party

Venstre (V) – The Liberal Party

Høyre (H) – The Conservative Party

Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) – The Progress Party

Miljøpartiet de grønne (MDG) – The Green Party

Sweden:

Vänsterpartiet (V) – Left Party

Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti (SAP) – The Swedish Social Democratic Party

Miljöpartiet de gröna (MP) – The Green Party

Centerpartiet (C) – The Centre Party

Folkpartiet liberalerna (FP) – The Liberal People's Party

Moderata samlingspartiet (M) – The Moderate Party

Kristdemokraterna (KD) – The Christian Democrats

Sverigedemokraterna (SD) – The Sweden Democrats

Denmark:

Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne – The Red-Green Alliance

Sosialistisk Folkeparti – The Socialist People's Party

Socialdemokratiet – The Social Democrats

Venstre – Venstre (the party has no official name in English)

Radikale Venstre – The Danish Social Liberal Party

Liberal Allianse – The Liberal Alliance

Det Konservative Folkeparti – The Conservative People's Party

Dansk Folkeparti – The Danish People's Party

Alternativet – The Alternative







# 1 Introduction

The broad topic of this thesis is welfare migration in the context of the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). More specifically, the thesis investigates which different perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Welfare migration<sup>2</sup> is defined as *the choice to migrate to a country based on the generosity of that country's welfare system*. By conducting a qualitative content analysis within an analytical framework of three different models of the EU as a democratic polity, this study seeks to place the discussion on welfare migration within the larger discussion on European integration.

The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU sparked a discussion on the topic of welfare migration in Europe, among politicians and policymakers as well as ordinary citizens (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009; Giulietti & Wahba, 2012; Warin & Svaton, 2008). While it has been more than a decade since the historic Eastern enlargement, the debate on welfare migration continues and is as relevant today as ever. At the core of the debate lies a concern, mainly expressed in the pre-enlargement countries (the EU-15<sup>3</sup>), that member states with extensive welfare systems are attracting migrants from member states with less extensive systems – thus inflicting unreasonable burdens on the countries with the more generous systems (Giulietti & Wahba, 2012, p. 2; De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2006, p. 2). This debate can be seen as a symptom of the challenge that the EU poses to the member states' national institutions and sovereignty. The concern for welfare migration is strongly connected with EU citizens' right to move and reside freely within the EU/EEA<sup>4</sup>, as this is thought to enable the abuse of national welfare systems. Because citizens of other EU/EEA countries have the right to choose which state they want to live in, and to not be discriminated on the basis of nationality, intra-EU migration also challenges national perceptions of political community and citizenship. Since freedom of movement is one of the core values of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2013), however, the discussion is one of controversy.

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<sup>2</sup> Also referred to as “welfare tourism” and “benefit tourism”. For an alternative definition, see Constant (2011, p. 6).

<sup>3</sup> Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

<sup>4</sup> Introduced as a central component of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, the right to move freely is secured in Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This freedom is further specified in Directive 2004/38/EC. Freedom of movement for workers, a long-established right, is ensured in Article 45 of the TFEU.

Welfare migration is a public concern in many European countries. One example of this is the longstanding discussion in Norway concerning the export of child benefits to Eastern European countries. A central argument in this debate is that the cost of living is much lower in Eastern European countries than in Norway and that child benefit payments based on Norwegian price levels are attracting migrants who seek to exploit the Norwegian welfare system. Adding fuel to the fire is the perceived EEA “meddling” with the national prerogative to determine who are entitled to child benefit, such as the 2013 EFTA Court ruling that Norway cannot discriminate between EEA workers’ right to child benefit based on marital status (EFTA Court, 2013).

Showing the extent of public concern is a 2014 Eurobarometer survey which reports that immigration now ranks as the third most important national issue after unemployment and the economic situation (European Commission (EC), 2014). Providing more direct proof in terms of welfare migration are the results from the spring wave of the 2009 Eurobarometer; when asked to respond to the statement “immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare services”, 51 per cent said that they disagreed, whereas only 22 per cent said that they agreed (EC, 2010).

Further evidence is a letter that was co-authored by the British, German, Austrian, and Dutch ministers of justice and home affairs (JHA) and sent to the (then) Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in May 2013. In the letter, they express concern about the effects on national welfare systems as a result of free movement within the enlarged EU (Jølstad, 2013). This was also a topic at the JHA council meeting in June 2013, where the EC was asked to review the implementation of the free-movement rules and present a report to the JHA council by the end of the year (Council of the European Union, 2013). While finding that job opportunities and family were important motivating factors behind EU/EEA migration, the EC found little evidence supporting the claim that EU migration is motivated by welfare benefits (Jølstad, 2013).

The preceding establishes welfare migration as a current and much discussed public concern in the EU/EEA. The following section presents and explores the background for the European welfare migration debate, with the goal of providing a basis for understanding why welfare migration has become such an important issue.

## 1.1 Background

The 2004 enlargement of the EU is considered historic not only because it was the single largest expansion of the EU to date, but also because it brought a number of Central and Eastern European countries<sup>5</sup> that had formerly been part of the Eastern Bloc, into its fold. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, these two enlargements constitute what is referred to as the fifth wave of enlargement.

Prior to the enlargements, economists highlighted the potential economic gains of removing barriers to trade, capital flows and migration in an enlarged EU. Geographical mobility of workers was seen as particularly beneficial, as it should improve the allocative efficiency of the EU markets – thereby strengthening the economy and contributing to alleviate the financial strain caused by an aging population and declining fertility rates in the old member states (Constant, 2011; De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2006; Kahenec, 2012). While most economists looked at the enlargement with optimism, many politicians and policy makers in the EU-15 harbored serious concerns regarding the economic and political disparities between the acceding and the old member states. In addition to the substantial differences in income between the old and the new member states, the limited political, economic and social contact between the East and the West during the previous decades, as well as the sheer scale of the enlargement, could explain the magnitude of the controversies surrounding it (Kahenec, 2012, pp. 2–3). Furthermore, the media played an important role in portraying the enlargement as an encroachment on the old member states, with far-reaching economic, social, cultural and political consequences (Constant, 2011, p. 2).

Because the internal market (ensuring the free movement of goods, capital, services and people) was already in place by the time of the enlargement, the most common pre-enlargement fears were mass migration, welfare migration, and native labor displacement (Constant, 2011, p. 6; Kahenec, Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2010, p. 4). The enlargement also raised questions about the impact of larger migration flows on the welfare state institutions of the receiving countries, and ultimately about their sustainability – a common fear being that it would lead to a European race to the bottom in terms of welfare policies (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2006, p. 2; Warin & Svaton, 2008, p. 1). These pre-enlargement fears manifested themselves in transitional arrangements, introduced by most of the EU-15 countries following

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<sup>5</sup> Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.

the 2004 enlargement. In direct contradiction to the principle of free movement, these arrangements allowed the old member states to retain their national laws and policies for a maximum period of seven years<sup>6</sup>, thus effectively refusing the newcomers access to their labor markets. Only Sweden, Ireland and the UK<sup>7</sup> opened access to their labor markets immediately following the accession. Finland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal lifted their labor market restrictions in 2006, with the Netherlands and Luxembourg following in 2007, France in 2008, and Belgium and Denmark in 2009. Only Germany and Austria kept the restrictions in place for the maximum period of seven years (Constant, 2011, pp. 2–3; Kahenec et al., 2010, pp. 4–5). While the transitional arrangements were meant to prevent migration, they lead instead to undeclared labor (EC, as cited in Constant, 2011, p. 11).

As seen above, welfare migration has become a serious public concern since the 2004 enlargement. Yet it is unclear whether or not welfare actually *is* a determinant of migration in the EU/EEA. Based on the findings from the EC commissioned report from 2013, one could draw the conclusion that notions of welfare migration within the EU/EEA are based on faulty assumptions about reality (i.e. about migrants' motivation) rather than empirical facts. This would, however, be a controversial conclusion. Why this is, will be shown in the following literature review.

## 1.2 Literature Review

In an attempt to discover whether or not generous welfare provisions attract migrants within the EU/EEA, a review of the existing literature seems pertinent. Determining the current status of knowledge is relevant for the thesis' analysis, as it will provide background information that will aid the interpretation of the different perceptions of welfare migration.

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<sup>6</sup> The transitional arrangements were based on the so-called "2+3+2" formula, whereby different conditions applied to each phase following the accession (European Commission, as cited in Constant, 2011).

<sup>7</sup> Immigrants who wished to work in the UK had to register with the Home Office administered Worker Registration Scheme within a month of joining a new employer. By registering, immigrants were able to claim some basic benefits depending on previous employment. This temporary measure lasted until 2011.

### 1.2.1 The Welfare Magnet Hypothesis

The “welfare magnet hypothesis” was coined by Borjas in his influential 1999 paper *Immigration and Welfare Magnets* (Giulietti and Wahba, 2012, p. 8). In this paper, he suggests that:

*It is possible ... that welfare programs attract immigrants who otherwise would not have migrated to the United States; or that the safety net discourages immigrants who “fail” in the United States from returning to their source countries; or that the huge interstate dispersion in welfare benefits affects the residential location choices of immigrants in the United States and places a heavy fiscal burden on relatively generous states.*

*(Borjas, 1999, p. 608)*

Taken out of a strictly U.S. context, the hypothesis indicates that “immigrants prefer to locate in countries with generous welfare provisions to insure themselves against labor market risks” (Giulietti & Wahba, 2012, p. 8). Because immigrants are a self-selected sample of persons who have already chosen to bear the fixed costs of a geographical move, selecting one state over another has little additional costs. Exhibiting income-maximizing behavior, welfare recipients among newly arrived immigrants “should be clustered in the states that offer the highest welfare benefits” (Borjas, 1999, pp. 608–609).

As for the composition of (potential) immigrants, Giulietti and Wahba (2012, p. 8) argue that “this effect may not be necessarily limited to unskilled immigrants, since also high-skilled immigrants may prefer to live in countries with larger social benefit systems”. However, Brücker et al. (as cited in Giulietti, Guzi, Kahenec & Zimmermann, 2011, p. 3) find that countries with generous welfare systems attract relatively more low-skilled workers compared to countries where social spending, and presumably the tax burden, is lower. Because of this, they argue, welfare generosity may induce an unfavorable sorting of immigrants.

### 1.2.2 Current Status of Knowledge

It is not until recently that welfare migration as a topic has generated substantial interest among scholars (Giulietti & Wahba 2012, p.2). The recent academic interest in Europe is undoubtedly due to the increase in popular concern regarding the role of welfare in attracting migrants, sparked by the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. Reviewing a number of recent empirical studies, among which a large number of papers that explore the welfare magnet

hypothesis within the context of the EU, Giulietti and Wahba (2012, abstract) find that “Although economic theory predicts that welfare generosity affects the number, composition and location of immigrants, the empirical evidence is rather mixed”.

Several studies have addressed the hypothesis by examining whether immigrants are more likely than natives to be welfare recipients (Giulietti & Wahba, 2012, p. 10). Analyzing the UK, where immigrants from new member states were subject to certain restrictions with regard to welfare access, Blanchflower and Lawton (2009, p. 188) find that between May 2004 and June 2008, “Only relatively small numbers of EU10<sup>8</sup> nationals have obtained state benefits such as Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance”. Interpreting these numbers, the authors claim that the immigrants “came to work and not to claim benefits”. At the same time, they report that “over 111,000 EU10 nationals have received Child Benefit”, for which entitlement is not dependent on income or employment status. Looking at post-2004 immigration from the new member states to Ireland and Sweden, Kahenec et al. (2010, p. 30) find that in the case of Ireland, there is no evidence of “welfare tourism”. The evidence from Sweden is more mixed, with immigrants being “slightly overrepresented in social assistance, but underrepresented in other income transfer programs“. In an EU commissioned report, Zimmermann, Kahenec, Giulietti, Guzi, Barrett and Maître (2012) find that when controlling for socio-economic characteristics such as age, education and family composition, welfare dependency persists only in seven member states. Moreover, the results are statistically insignificant and the causal effect from social welfare spending to immigration is found to be very weak. This leads the authors to reject the welfare magnet hypothesis (Zimmermann et al., 2012, p. vi).

These studies all use the welfare dependency of immigrants as a measure to test the welfare magnet hypothesis. However, as Giulietti and Wahba (2012, p. 13) point out, examining the gap in welfare dependency between immigrants and natives might not be the best way to test the welfare magnet hypothesis as “immigrants’ excess welfare use does not necessarily imply that generous welfare states attract immigrants”. Studies that focus on the locational choices of migrants arguably yield more credible results. One such study comes from Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2008), who examine immigration flows into the OECD countries between 1990 and 2000. Testing the welfare magnet hypothesis by using public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP as a measure of welfare generosity, their results indicate

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<sup>8</sup> EU10 refers to the ten countries that entered the EU in 2004.

that there is no clear evidence that public social expenditures have had a major influence on migration patterns. Although the effect of public social spending is statistically insignificant, their results do indicate the existence of a U-shaped effect, where the effect is bigger for the poorest and richest source countries (Pedersen et al., 2008, p. 1180).

Warin and Svaton (2008) similarly estimate the welfare state effect by looking at total social protection expenditure per capita in purchasing power parity standards. Unlike Pedersen et al., however, they do find that the welfare state, in combination with other economic, network, geospatial and linguistic effects, plays a role in explaining migration flows into the EU-15. This leads them to conclude that “The crucial finding that the level of social protection expenditure sends an important signal to potential immigrants lends considerable support for the welfare state magnets hypothesis in the European context” (Warin & Svaton, 2008, p. 26). They do however emphasize that

*...there exists an offsetting mechanism between the unemployment rate and social protection expenditure in the host country with respect to attracting immigrants, but the negative effect of the unemployment rate seems to be disproportionately more important than the positive effect of social protection expenditure in attracting migrants to the host country.*

*(Warin & Svaton, 2008, p. 23)*

Examining migration flows from the new member states into the EU-15, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) use the net replacement rate<sup>9</sup> as a measure of welfare generosity. While their findings suggest that “the generosity of the welfare state may act as a migration magnet across the countries of the European Union”, they too find that compared to the role of labor market conditions, such as the unemployment rate and the level of wages, “the size of these welfare magnets is relatively low” (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009, p. 361). Conversely, using unemployment benefit spending (UBS) as a proxy for welfare generosity, Giulietti et al. (2011, abstract) find that “All estimates for immigrants from EU origins indicate that flows within the EU are not related to unemployment benefit generosity. This suggests that the so-called ‘welfare migration’ debate is misguided and not based on empirical evidence”.

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<sup>9</sup> The net replacement is “the ratio between income out of work – i.e. from welfare benefits – and income in work – i.e. some measure of the average wage”, and is used to measure welfare generosity (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009, p. 355).

The preceding review of literature supports Giulietti and Wahba's (2012, p. 15) conclusion that the empirical evidence on the welfare magnet hypothesis is mixed, and that "when evidence of a magnet effect is found, the impact tends to be rather exiguous". They offer two potential explanations for the mixed empirical findings: the possibility of reverse causality between welfare spending and immigration and the existence of different migration regimes (Giulietti and Wahba, 2012, p. 14). The latter explanation is particularly relevant for this thesis, as the EU is a so-called free-migration regime.

In their study, Razin and Wahba (2001) distinguishes free-migration from policy-controlled migration regimes. In a free-migration regime, such as the EU, the impact of welfare generosity is expected to be negative on the skill composition of migrants (as the welfare state attracts unskilled migrants who are likely to be net beneficiaries of the welfare state), while the impact will be positive in a restricted mobility regime (since voters will prefer selective migration policies that favor skilled migrants who tend to be net contributors to the fiscal system). Comparing a free-migration regime with a policy-controlled regime, represented by migration within the EU, Norway and Switzerland and migration from outside of the EU respectively, Razin and Wahba (2011, p. 30) find strong support for the welfare magnet hypothesis under the free migration regime and strong support for the so-called "fiscal burden hypothesis" under the policy-controlled regime.

To summarize, the literature does not provide a crystal clear answer to the question of whether welfare generosity functions as a magnet on migrants. Several of the more recent (and arguably more reliable) studies focusing on intra-EU migration do however lend some support for the welfare magnet hypothesis. For this reason, the tentative conclusion drawn here is that welfare generosity does have a slight effect on European migrants' locational choices, but this effect is negligible when compared with the effect of unemployment rates and wage levels. Having established a baseline for the interpretation and understanding of existing perceptions of welfare migration, the next section addresses the thesis' research question and sets its scope.

## **1.3 Objectives and Research Question**

As the literature review above shows, much research has been done in an attempt to discover whether or not welfare generosity is a determinant of migration into the EU-15. There has,



however, been little research on what constitutes different perceptions of welfare migration, and how these perceptions are expressed. Perceptions or ideas are interesting because they can help us understand political actors and their decisions (Bratberg, 2014, p. 57). Regardless of the empirical evidence then, which at present is both unclear and conflicting, perceptions of welfare migration have the potential to influence policy – and are therefore well worth investigating. In an attempt to bring something new to the scientific debate on welfare migration, this thesis will investigate perceptions of welfare migration among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark.

The primary objective of the thesis is to investigate how different perceptions of welfare migration manifest themselves in the party platforms of the Scandinavian parties currently represented in parliament. Because the study also wishes to say something about welfare migration within the bigger discussion on European integration, the research question is twofold:

*Which perceptions of welfare migration, within the context of the EU/EEA, exist and dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark? And do these perceptions reflect a nation-based, a federal, or a cosmopolitan view of the EU?*

To examine what constitutes different perceptions of welfare migration, the thesis will make use of qualitative content analysis. Three models of the EU as a democratic polity, created on the basis of EU citizenship theory, will provide the analytical framework through which the perceptions will be captured and filtered. Mapping which actors subscribe to which perceptions will provide the necessary grounds for comparison, both across and within each of the countries.

## **1.4 Case Selection**

Norway, Sweden and Denmark have been chosen for comparison because they are countries that are similar on a number of different variables. All three countries have parliamentary multi-party systems with roughly the same number of parties represented in parliament. Moreover, the three countries are all relatively small and ethnically homogenous states, and they share a common political culture that takes the form of the Scandinavian welfare state (Hansen, 2002, p. 11). The Nordic welfare state (or the Nordic model) is described as *extensive* in terms of the kind of social needs it seeks to meet, as *institutionalized* in that it

offers all legal citizens – through social rights – a decent standard of living, and as *universal* in that welfare policies have been aimed at the whole population as opposed to particularly vulnerable groups (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, as cited in Brochmann & Hagelund, 2010, p. 23). Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 69–77) shows that the Scandinavian countries cluster together around socialist regime attributes, and argues that universalism is the reigning principle in social democratic welfare states.

Also relevant for this thesis, are the immigration and integration policies that have been and are being pursued in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. While the three countries' policies were quite similar until the 1980s (to a large extent because of the influence of Sweden as a pioneer in the policy area), this has changed in the last few decades. Public debates in Denmark have in recent years taken on a harder tone, with more immigrant critical viewpoints being voiced. Danish policies have also become more restrictive, both in terms of immigration control and social policy. Some of the same developments can be seen in public debates in Norway, although to a lesser degree. Changes in immigration legislation and social rights have also been less pronounced than in Denmark. In Sweden, on the other hand, public debates are much more muted. Sweden has also been more careful in terms of tightening immigration policies significantly (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2010, pp. 29–30). With regards to citizenship, there has been a high degree of harmonization between the three countries in terms of the principles by which citizenship is granted (Ersbøll, as cited in Olsen, 2014, p. 136). The three countries have likewise had similar policies in terms of political rights given to non-citizens (Olsen, 2014, p. 136).

Although the three Scandinavian countries are similar in many respects, they differ in terms of their form of affiliation with the EU. Norway is integrated in the EU and the internal market through the EEA Agreement. The EEA Agreement was signed by the Norwegian prime minister in 1994, after the Norwegian people had voted no to full EU membership in a plebiscite the same year. The Norwegian people also voted no to joining the European Community (later to become the EU) in a plebiscite in 1972, when Denmark voted yes. Denmark does, however, hold several important opt-outs from the EU in the policy areas citizenship, police and justice, common security and defense policy (CSDP), and economic and monetary union (EMU). These opt-outs were secured in the Edinburgh Agreement of 1992, after a referendum for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (which upon its entry created the EU) was rejected by Danish voters in 1992. Sweden did not apply for membership

of the European Community in 1972, but joined the newly created EU in 1994. Sweden is the most fully integrated member of the three countries, with the only opt-out being from the Eurozone.

The comparative design flowing from this case selection allows for an investigation into the role the form of affiliation with the EU has on perceptions of welfare migration. Because the cases are similar on a number of dimensions, but differ on the EU dimension, any significant national differences in how welfare migration can arguably be accounted for by form of affiliation.

## **1.5 Thesis Structure**

This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents and discusses the analytical framework that has been chosen in order to investigate which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Scandinavia. While the first part of the chapter is concerned with the thesis' theoretical approach, including EU citizenship theory and the analytical framework, the second part of the chapter deals with the methodological approach of the thesis, including method, research design and data. In chapter 3, the analysis is conducted and the findings discussed. Chapter 4 concludes the thesis, discusses implications of the findings, and deliberates on potential avenues of future research.

## 2 Analytical Framework

This chapter presents and discusses the analytical framework that has been chosen in order to answer the research question, namely which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Because the EU/EEA is the larger context in which European welfare migration is discussed, EU citizenship theory provides the theoretical backdrop against which perceptions of welfare migration are examined. EU citizenship challenges the traditional understanding of citizenship as something that is primarily linked to the state and the nation (Bauböck, 2007, p. 454; Olsen, 2013, p. 505; Preuss, Everson, Koenig-Archibugi & Lefebvre, 2003, p. 4). Accordingly, the EU (and any potential developments in the direction of a supranational polity) challenges European nation-states, as the individual states are no longer in complete control over their communities.

The discussion on welfare migration is a manifestation of the challenge that the EU and EU citizenship pose to national citizenship, national institutions and national sovereignty. Intra-EU migration challenges national perceptions of political community and citizenship because citizens of other EU/EEA countries – through EU citizenship – have the right to move and reside freely in the EU. Moreover, with the introduction of EU citizenship, any discrimination on the basis of nationality has been prohibited (EU, 2010, pp. 56–57). In order to uncover and understand the different perceptions of welfare migration, this study makes use of three different models of the EU, envisioning the EU as a nation-based, a multinational federal and a cosmopolitan polity respectively. The method used is qualitative content analysis, more specifically textual idea analysis. Because idea analysis is well suited for mapping ideas in text and for extracting and filtering them according to the context in which they occur, it is considered the proper method for answering the research question posed in this thesis.

While EU citizenship theory is the subject of the first part of the chapter, idea analysis is the subject of the second. Before concluding the chapter, research design and data will be discussed.

## 2.1 Theoretical Approach

As mentioned above, this thesis makes use of a nation-based, a multinational federal and a cosmopolitan model of the EU to investigate which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Scandinavia. These models are based on EU citizenship theory, which touches upon several aspects that are central to the discussion on European welfare migration. Freedom of movement is at the core of this discussion. EU citizens' right to move and reside freely ensures that the threshold to relocate is low, and has consequently been central to the concerns for welfare migration that have been voiced since the 2004 enlargement. Welfare migration is a worry not only because of the large socio-economic differences between the "old" and the "new" member states, but also because the social dimension of the EU has not been developed at the same speed as the economic dimension – and social benefit schemes vary greatly from member state to member state. This deficiency in terms of social cohesion, in combination with freedom of movement, has been seen not only as a threat to the welfare state, but as a threat to the EU as a political and social community. As will be seen in the following, most scholars believe that ameliorating this situation is critical for the future development of EU citizenship. In addition, it is believed that a certain amount of community feeling is necessary to secure the success of future European integration.

The three models of the EU that provides the framework for next chapter's analysis are three different visions of what the EU as a democratic polity should look like. These models embody some of the most common opinions and beliefs about the viability of EU citizenship and the potential opportunities and challenges it presents for the future of European integration. For this reason, some of the main theoretical streams of the vast EU citizenship literature is presented and discussed before the three models are laid out. Before embarking on EU citizenship theory, however, it is necessary to define citizenship, as this is a contested concept in political theory. For analytical purposes, citizenship will be broken down into two main dimensions that will provide the building blocks for the three models. These dimensions will also aid the dissection of the perceptions of welfare migration found in the analysis.

### 2.1.1 Defining Citizenship

In this thesis, citizenship is broadly defined as a legal status that entails certain rights and that links an individual to a political entity, as well as a source of identity that creates feelings of belonging with the community of the political entity. In political theory, however, citizenship is a contested concept (Isin, 2002; Miller, 2000, p. 82; Preuss et al., 2003; Tilly 2005, pp. 197–198). There are, however, certain fundamental components of citizenship that most definitions encompass (whether explicitly or implicitly). In addition to being a legal status establishing membership and entailing certain rights (and sometimes duties), citizenship also provides members of a community with an identity and a sense of belonging.

Traditionally, conceptions of citizenship have been closely connected with those of state and nation (Bauböck 2007, p. 454; Preuss et al., 2003, p. 4, 6). While the concept of state is linked to formal membership, the concept of nation is linked to a specific type of identity. Preuss et al. argues that

*State-building meant the creation of a unified, legally homogenized and bureaucratically controlled territory, the gradual transformation of a segmented set of dissociated individuals... into the corporate unity of culturally and legally standardized subjects whose loyalty was forcefully directed, and...the institutionalization of one supreme and exclusive force within the boundaries of that territory – sovereignty.*

*(Preuss et al., 2003, p. 4)*

Brubaker (1992, p. 21) defines modern citizenry to coincide roughly with a state's permanent resident population, from which foreigners and stateless persons are excluded. Citizenship, he contends, is internally inclusive and externally exclusive. Despite using residency in defining citizenry, Brubaker argues that the modern state is more than a mere territorial organization. It is also a membership organization, an association of citizens:

*The state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular, bounded citizenry; it claims legitimacy by claiming to express the will and further the interest of that citizenry. This bounded citizenry is usually conceived as a nation – as something more cohesive than a mere aggregate of persons who happen legally to belong to the state.*

*(Brubaker, 1992, p. 21)*

Discussing nation-building, Rokkan (1999, p. 170) highlights the development of standard languages as a step in the process of territory-building in Europe. Reaffirming the territorial

identity of the state was thought to be easier if there was one common language within the territory. While any language could transmit what Rokkan describes as the lore of the land, “the symbolism they were intended to convey would be much stronger if language and state were coterminous” (Rokkan, 1999, p. 170).

The foregoing conceptions of citizenship can be placed within the classical Westphalian model of citizenship, in which citizenship rights are ineradicably fixed to territory and nationality (Shore, 2004, p. 29). This model is obvious in Bodin’s writings on the nexus between citizenship, territoriality and sovereignty, in which he stresses four dimensions:

*first, only one sovereign power can exercise legitimate rule within a territory; second, no person can be the subject of more than one sovereign; third, all citizens have the same legal status and stand in exactly the same relationship with the sovereign; and fourth, the ties that bind the citizen and sovereign totally exclude aliens.*

*(Bodin, as cited in Linklater, 1998b, p. 200)*

Summing up the Westphalian model with an equation, Balibar (as cited in Shore, 2004, p. 41) argues that [nationality = citizenship] = sovereignty.

More recent conceptions of citizenship focus less on state and nation and more on the relations between citizens and the agents of a given political entity (i.e. on rights and participation). Tilly (2005, p. 173) regards citizenship as an organized set of social ties; rights and obligations bind people who are legally recognized by a state with agents of that state. Because categories of persons are related to agents of government through a set of mutually enforceable claims, Tilly (2005, p. 193) holds that citizenship has the character of a contract:

*...variable in range, never completely specified, always depending on unstated assumptions about context, modified by practice, constrained by collective memory, yet ineluctably involving rights and obligations sufficiently defined that either party is likely to express indignation and take corrective action when the other fails to meet expectations built into the relationship.*

Similarly, Olsen (2013, p. 508) describes citizenship as a phenomenon “which is created, activated and transformed in specific institutional practices”. Citizenship does not only tie individuals to a specific political unit; it is also always bestowed upon individuals by specific institutions, and affected in its scope by political practices.

Preuss et al. (2003, p. 7) stress that although nationality is widely regarded as synonymous with citizenship, there is a conceptual difference between the two terms. Historically, nationality was a position of passive submission, a status given to subjects of the state. Citizenship, on the other hand, was an active status given only to a small share of the nationals, who were given the opportunity to participate in the shaping of the polity. Because citizenship has become increasingly inclusive over the course of the last few centuries, and most adults today enjoy the status of citizenship, the two concepts have conflated in modern usage. Yet, Preuss et al. (2003, p. 7) argue, the concepts of nationality and citizenship serve different functions:

*Nationality is the legal concept that defines the legal membership of an individual of a state. It is the starting point for citizenship, but it is not citizenship itself. Citizenship is the status that encompasses the rights, duties, benefits and burdens that follow from a person's nationality. Hence, to be the national of a particular state means to be its citizen. But it is less clear what it means to be its citizen, since the amount and the character of the rights, duties, benefits and burdens associated with this status are not determined by the laws on nationality.*

The above discussion shows that different aspects of citizenship are emphasized in different conceptions of citizenship. In order to better be able to understand the various conceptions of citizenship as expressed in the literature, this thesis makes use of two analytical dimensions of citizenship. These are presented in the following.

## **Dimensions of Citizenship**

Analytically, citizenship can be broken down into two basic dimensions: citizenship as a *legal status* and citizenship as *belonging*. These two dimensions are analytically individual, but theoretically interrelated.

Citizenship as a *legal status* relates to formal membership in the community (determined by what type of criteria are used when granting nationality). More important for this thesis, however, are the rights – the entitlements – that derive from the status of citizenship. Citizens enjoy a number of rights that non-citizens do not, and these rights are fixed to citizenship through the status as a member of a political unit. Today, citizen rights are usually conferred upon individuals by virtue of their status as nationals of the given state (see the above discussion of Preuss et al., 2003). Following from the status as citizenship is also the right to participate: “citizenship has expressed a right to being political, a right to constitute oneself as



an agent to govern and be governed, deliberate with others, and enjoin determining the fate of the polity to which one belongs” (Isin, 2002, p. 1). Operationally, one must look at the extension of rights, on whom they are bestowed, and the degree to which they are exclusive (Olsen, 2008, p. 44; Olsen, 2013, p. 509).

Citizenship as *belonging* relates to the informal aspect of membership in a community. It can be described as an identity that provides members with a sense of belonging, and says something about who belongs and who does not. The key question is how the community is built up, what its constitutive parts are, and how it is different from other communities (Olsen, 2008, p. 43). As underlined by Isin (2002, p. 22, 29), social groups are formed in relation to other groups and not isolation from them. This, then, determines how a given community constitutes itself, how it differentiates itself from other communities, and how citizenship as a group identity is defined. Operationally, identity can be investigated by looking at what notions bind a community of citizens together, how membership is framed in terms of belonging, and which characteristics are used to separate *us* from *them*.

As will be seen in the following discussion on EU citizenship, how these dimensions are construed, and which aspects of the dimensions are emphasized, varies with different conceptions of citizenship.

### **2.1.2 EU Citizenship**

Citizenship of the European Union was introduced by the Maastrich Treaty in 1992, and entered into force on 1 November 2003. Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)<sup>10</sup> establishes that “any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited”. In addition, according to articles 20–25, citizens of the EU shall enjoy a number of rights, including:

- The right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States
- The right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament (EP) and in local elections in their member state of residence
- The right to be protected by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any member state

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<sup>10</sup> 2010 consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome (1957).

- The right to petition the EP, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address any of the EU institutions

EU citizenship is given to every person who is a national of a member state. The TFEU clearly states that EU citizenship is additional to, and does not replace, national citizenship (EU, 2010, p. 56–58). As pointed out by Shaw (1997, p. 2), this refers back to a provision of the Maastricht Treaty<sup>11</sup> which states that “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy” (EU, 1992, p. 9)<sup>12</sup>. Because it is in effect the member states that decide who can and cannot become citizens of the EU, Bauböck (as cited in Preuss et al., 2003, p. 5) comments that “the dogma of state sovereignty in determining nationality remains unchallenged”.

While being a supranational innovation, EU citizenship has been criticized for adding little to the already existing rights that can be found in the treaties. For this reason, its introduction was “regarded in some quarters as a false prospectus” (Jacobs, 2007, p. 592). Along the same line, Follesdal (2001a, pp. 314–315) describes EU citizenship’s content as “anemic”. Because Europeans already enjoy a wide range of civil, political and social rights, he contends, the function of EU citizenship remains unclear and contested. Regardless of being regarded as merely a “token citizenship” and an attempt at building a European identity, Delanty (2007, p. 66) argues that the introduction of the EU citizenship put the Union “on the road to a constitutional polity as opposed to an intergovernmental organization based on states”. Moreover, he contends that because EU citizenship for the first time “defined the EU in terms of a relation to the individual citizen”, it was a momentous departure from the integration model that had been in use since the Treaty of Rome (Delanty, 2007, p. 66).

Preuss et al. (2003, pp. 4–5) point to the fact that the EU lacks the essential properties of a state: First, the EU territory is not unified, but defined by the territoriality of the member states. Second, there is no unified body of subjects since citizens are tied primarily to the individual member states and their respective institutions. Third, the EU does not have

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<sup>11</sup> Originally Article F of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the wording of this provision has been changed in the 2010 consolidated versions of the EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Now found in Article 4 (2) of the TEU and the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, there is no longer any reference to the member states being founded on democratic principles, but rather that the Union is.

<sup>12</sup> While EU citizenship being additional to national citizenship might refer back to this provision of the Maastricht Treaty, the relationship of the EU citizenship vis-à-vis national Member State citizenship was not clarified until the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Follesdal, 2001b, p. 233).

sovereignty as its authority derives from the member states' transferal of competencies through the various treaties. Yet, Preuss et al. argues, the EU has transcended the limited character of alliances and confederations:

*...the EU is now a political entity enjoying a substantial degree of autonomy in devising policies and implementing them through the use of regulative powers characteristic of statehood. Most remarkable is the development of a distinct legal order of the European Community, which includes highly institutionalized mechanisms of law-making, the direct effect of its law on the member states (with regard to both their state organs and their citizens), and the superiority of its law over member state law in the case of collision – even vis-à-vis conflicting constitutional law.*

*(Preuss et al., 2003, p. 5)*

EU citizenship challenges the traditional understanding of citizenship as something that is intrinsically linked with state and nation (Bauböck, 2007, p. 454; Olsen, 2013, p. 505; Preuss et al., 2003, p. 4). Because the EU is more than an intergovernmental organization, it poses a challenge to the member states' sovereignty, as they are no longer in complete control over their communities. With the introduction of EU citizenship, certain supranational rights were also afforded all EU citizens, among them the right to move and reside freely within the EU and the right of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality. These supranational rights challenge national citizenship and national institutions such as national welfare schemes – as the individual states are no longer free to determine who has access to them.

While some see the extension of citizenship beyond the state as something that could potentially have radical implications for the meaning of democracy, others argue that there can be no meaningful citizenship, and therefore no democracy, without the nation-state. The following section presents the main streams of EU citizenship literature.

### **2.1.3 Dominant Streams in EU Citizenship Theory**

As mentioned in the introduction, the bulk of literature on EU citizenship has focused on the potential opportunities and challenges it presents for future European integration. Discussions about EU citizenship are ultimately linked to what kind of European society, what kind of EU polity, the author deems to be practicable – and desirable. The three streams presented here embody the most common opinions on the subject and are reflected in the models that will

serve as the analytical framework for the analysis. The three models will be presented in the subsequent section of the chapter.

EU citizenship literature can first and foremost be divided into two main streams. One envisages EU citizenship as the door opener for a post-national European polity, the other points to implications and limitations of EU citizenship within the framework of the EU treaties, and the fact that there is no unified European people. A third, more empirically oriented stream, focuses on Europeanization and the degree to which EU norms and policies have been and are impacting national citizenship institutions (Bauböck, 2007, p. 454; Olsen, 2013, p. 507).

### **Post-nationalists**

In the words of Shore (2004, p. 30), advocates of EU citizenship consider it to be a “democratic development with far-reaching implications that could put the integration project onto a totally new constitutional footing: the beginnings of a more direct relationship between the Union and its people”. This statement holds true for Gerstenberg (2001, p. 299), who holds that there are current trends in Europe related to globalization and privatization that point toward the release of the ideas of citizenship and democracy from concepts such as territorial sovereignty and nationality; Europe is on the verge of a constitutional moment, and this process will change not only the institutional landscape, but also the very idea of democratic constitutionalism.

This process of de-nationalization does not have to mean a primacy of markets over politics; it does not have to be true that “the economic rights and liberties of the market citizen – property, tort and contract – are the true constitution of the EU” (Mestmäcker, as cited in Gerstenberg, 2001, p. 303). Nor does de-nationalization have to mean that revitalization of the nation-state is the only viable option for social solidarity and democracy. Gerstenberg argues that deliberative and direct democracy can be liberated from the limitations imposed upon it by the presupposed connection to territoriality and nationality, and that the pluralization and extension of democracy to new post-national contexts is not only possible through the development of new forms of democratic governance, but also desirable: “By creating and fostering those communicative environments which are required by radical democracy in the form of a post-national deliberative polyarchy, European law could gradually *bootstrap* itself to legitimacy” (Gerstenberg, 2001, p. 321).

Linklater (1998a) agrees that cosmopolitan citizenship would necessitate the establishment of international public spheres of dialogue and consent. Through communities of discourse, Linklater (1998a, p. 37) contends that this type of citizenship can contribute to the relief of certain tensions inherent in modern states, such as the tension between duties toward fellow nationals and duties toward the rest of humanity. As for the “unique experiment in international cooperation” that is the EU, Linklater (1998a, p. 33) argues that the creation of transnational institutions securing legal, political, social and cultural rights would indeed be a major exercise in implementing the ideals of a dialogical conception of world citizenship. While there might for now be a democratic deficit in the EU, he argues that states are engaging in discussions about new forms of citizenship and post-national democracy as a consequence of globalization:

*Erosions of sovereignty have yet to be accompanied by the radical alternation of traditional assumptions about citizenship. Even so, by virtue of their commitments to constitutional democracy, states are increasingly drawn into discussions about how the achievements of national citizenship can be retained and consolidated as the logics of globalization transform modern political life.*

*(Linklater, 1998b, p. 198)*

Habermas (2001, pp. 111) states that governing elites will have to exert influence on their national constituents in order to preserve social standards and redress social inequities in a post-national constellation. Habermas makes a particular reference to the political parties in the EU member states:

*Within the national sphere – the only one they can currently operate in – they have to reach out toward a European arena of action. And this arena, in turn, has to be programmatically opened up with the dual objective of creating a social Europe that can throw its weight onto the cosmopolitan scale.*

*(Habermas, 2001, p. 112)*

Dobson (2007, p. 137) proposes that the EU should be regarded as a *community of rights*, a community made up of “reasonable composite selves interconnected by mutuality of respect and recognition”. She argues that the development of a consequential EU citizenship is possible without supplanting already existing political affiliations, and without trying to invoke historical or socio-biological notions of “European-ness”. Dobson (2007, pp. 149–150) states that EU-level affect, like all notions of community above the local level (including national-level affect), is a mental construct. As such, it can be created. Acceding that such

political constructs mold the real world and are in all likelihood necessary to a free politics, she nevertheless contends that an EU-level affect does not have to be as comprehensive as national-level affect. EU institutions and policies, and the social interaction they lead to, can result in feelings of mutual respect and recognition:

*Common institutions and policies can focus awareness of the extent to which one's interests are bound up with the interests of larger groups, and supporting and making use of its institutions and policies will lead to agents' acknowledgement that they share in both the burdens and the benefits of the polity. The repeating experience of successful cooperation between agents creates social bonds conducing to further cooperativeness and the formation of communal trust.*

*(Gewirth, as cited in Dobson, 2007, p. 150)*

Such factors, Dobson (2007, p. 150) points out, have been an integral part of the process through which people have come to identify themselves as members of a given community, be it a national or another type of community.

The post-nationalists release the concept of citizenship (and democracy) from concepts such as state and nation. They argue that deliberation and new, supranational forms of democratic governance are the keys to success for post-national polities. For the post-nationalists, the citizenship aspects of rights and participation are much more important than a shared identity and physical belonging.

### **No-demos Theorists**

Many scholars have focused on the nation-aspect and the fact that there is no single European people, the so-called *no-demos* thesis. According to this thesis, democracy requires that a community of people identify themselves as a *demos* (Nicolaidis, 2004, p. 81). For this to happen, certain prior conditions have to exist. Different authors give different meanings to what these necessary conditions consist of, examples being a common language, history, or common political culture (Grimm, 1995; Miller, 1995; Shore, 2004). The absence of such prior conditions is seen to impede democracy because where there is no *demos*, there can be no democracy – and consequently no “genuine” citizenship beyond the nation-state (Miller, 1995; Olsen, 2013, p. 507). Since there is no one European people, then, but rather several separate national *demoi*, “democracy at the European level is a fruitless pursuit” (Nicolaidis, 2004, p. 81).

Miller (1995, p. 165) claims that national identities provide people with the kind of social map that they need in order to understand the social world around them. Nationality is different from other collective sources of personal identity for a number of reasons: First, its members share a belief that they belong together and they are mutually committed to continuing their life in common. Second, it is an identity that embodies historical continuity and that stretches both backwards into the past and forwards into the future. Third, it is an active identity, meaning that the nation becomes what it is through the decisions that it collectively makes. Fourth, it is an identity which connects a group of people to a particular geographical place. And fifth, it is an identity which requires the people who share it to have a common public culture (Miller, 1995, pp. 22–27). The last element of Miller’s conception of national identities needs a bit of clarification: Defining public culture as “a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together”, Miller (1995, p. 26) maintains that while they vary from case to case, they will always include political principles and social norms, and quite possibly also cultural ideals. Furthermore, while common public cultures are necessary prerequisites for national identities, they are not all embracing, and they may leave room for sub-cultures to exist within the borders of the nation.

As for supranational citizenship, Miller (1995, pp. 159–163) grants that perhaps we can look forward to more complex nested identities. If the public culture becomes narrowly political and takes the form of patriotism to the constitution (so-called “constitutional patriotism”), he argues, it would allow for an easy extension of political identity to the European level. It would not, however, provide individuals with the kind of identity that nationality does. Only by embracing a national identity and the obligations that go along with it that it, he contends, is it possible to sustain a society which in turn can provide the conditions under which it is possible to pursue “the good life” in security (Miller, 1995, p. 165). Citizen rights and duties, then, are placed within the nation-state.

Grimm’s (1995, pp. 292–299) main argument is that a well-functioning democracy is dependent upon the existence of certain intermediary structures within society, structures such as political parties, interest groups and communication systems. These structures are necessary because governing institutions must be answerable before the people who have given them the right to exercise power over them. While seeing the Europeanization of both national party systems and interest groups as a possibility, Grimm argues that there are no prospects for Europeanization of the communication system because there is no common

language in the EU. Because there is as yet a lack of truly European mediatory structures, and consequently no European *demos*, Grimm argues that the transformation of the EU into a federal state is undesirable and would only weaken the legitimacy of the Union.

Like Miller, Shore (2004) focuses on the functions of citizenship as an identity-marker and classificatory device. Shore argues that a narrowly public culture based on patriotism to a constitution, to law, is unthinkable because rights cannot be meaningfully divorced from identity: “the identity-endowing element of citizenship derives precisely from the legal and political benefits, rights and duties that citizenship confers upon its members” (Shore, 2004, p. 29). EU citizenship, he contends, is an attempt at creating a European *demos*:

*‘European Citizenship’ exemplifies what anthropologists call a ‘blank banner or ‘mobilizing metaphor’: a free-floating signifier designed not so much to generate support for the EU among its would-be European public, but to invent the category of a ‘European public’ in the first place.*

*(Shore, 2004, p. 31)*

Furthermore, Shore argues that the creation of an EU citizenship challenges one of the fundamental principles of the EU:

*For decades, the goal of the EU, summed up in the Treaty of Rome, has been to ‘lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. Not the creation of ‘one people’ but a union of many.*

*(Shore, 2004, p. 32)*

Shore (2004, p. 38–40) argues that the attempt to create a European identity through the use of nation-building strategies is to undermine the many peoples of the EU, and that the establishment of an EU citizenship is premature since there is no European *demos*. In defense of the nation-states, he argues that it is their history and the successive adaptation and reformation of their institutions that have allowed them to get close to their citizens and winning their consent to be governed. Like Grimm, Shore underlines the importance of mediatory societal structures in this process, and point to the lack of such pan-European structures. In conclusion, “the EU is simply too large, too diverse and too cumbersome to be an effective democratic unit” (Shore, 2004, p. 40).

The no-*demos* theorists give great emphasis to nationality and a shared identity in their discussion of EU citizenship. Rights, they argue, cannot be separated from identity.



Accordingly, they contend that a supranational EU – consisting of many peoples rather than one people – is doomed to fail. For the post-nationalists, identity and physical belonging are the decisive components in citizenship.

## **Europeanization Theorists**

In the more empirically oriented stream of EU citizenship literature, the focus is on Europeanization and the degree to which EU norms and policies are impacting national citizenship institutions. Jacobs (2007, p. 592) contends that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been able to give EU citizenship a more substantial content than what the articles of the TFEU explicitly express – a content he suggests is perhaps more substantial than what the authors of the Maastricht Treaty originally envisaged (see also Constant, 2006).

Delanty (2007, p. 66–68) maintains that the introduction of the EU citizenship was a momentous departure from the integration model in use since the Treaty of Rome because it meant that the EU for the first time defined itself in terms of a relation to the individual citizen. According to Delanty, the most important implication of EU citizenship is the fact that it is defined in terms of residence rather than birth or descent. While acknowledging the critics who point to the fact that passports are still national and limited to citizens of the member states, Delanty nonetheless maintains that given the diversity of national policies of immigration and naturalization, the introduction of an EU citizenship has meant a loosening of the bond between citizenship and nationality. Moreover, it has resulted in increased migration between the member states. Consequently, citizenship has become a “contested domain in which the state is only one actor” (Delanty, 2007, p. 71).

Furthermore, Delanty (2007, pp. 67–68) claims that Europeanization of the national context through EU legislation is resulting in a gradual process of convergence of citizenship in the member states. While arguing that the centrality of rights to the definition of the European polity is the striking feature of the Europeanization of citizenship, he does not believe in the success of a purely rights-based model. This model has not succeeded, as made evident by the constitutional crisis of 2005<sup>13</sup>, because it has not been coupled with the EU citizenship tradition of solidarity and social justice (Delanty, 2007, pp. 68–71). Investigating Greek

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<sup>13</sup> In 2004, a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was signed by representatives of the (then) 25 member states, but failed to be ratified after French and Dutch voters rejected the draft constitutional treaty in May and June 2005.

practices and policies pertaining to citizenship and minorities, Agnastou (2005, p. 355) contends that “While there is little evidence indicating a reconceptualisation of national identity”, Europeanization has nonetheless brought about a change in the shape of a widespread acceptance among the Greek elite for the liberal view that guarantees equal rights for all individuals. Also looking at convergence is Odmalm (2007, p. 30), who argue that member states that have traditionally been big receivers of immigrants – but that are now having reservations about further immigration – are putting pressure on more liberal states to adjust their policies because of a fear of becoming “final destination” countries. He contends that it is with regard to the inclusion of certain integration requirements demanding that immigrants show a willingness to assimilate, that the most significant degree of harmonization is taking place. This is happening, he argues, because “the relationship between the ‘nation state’ is still strong while the link between ‘EU’ and ‘citizenship’ is still weak”.

Not all authors find evidence of convergence, however. Investigating German debates over citizenship and membership, Checkel (2001, pp. 196–197) argues that Europeanization (defined as “the development of new collective understandings on citizenship and membership at the European level”) of nationality or citizenship is emergent at best. Investigating the Netherlands, Vink (2001) finds that Europeanization of citizenship is limited by strong and reticent national institutions, and contends that “There is...no binding EU legislation on citizenship policy because EU Member States strongly oppose any Community action in this respect” (Vink, 2001, p. 878). He does, however, mention several cases in which rulings by the European Court of Justice have affected member states’ citizenship policies and indeed have affirmed that domestic citizenship policy falls within the scope of Community law (Vink, 2001, pp. 884–885, 892). With this in mind, Vink does not rule out the possibility of stronger EU involvement in domestic citizenship policies in the future.

While the post-nationalists and the no-demos theorists, sometimes referred to as visionaries and skeptics (see Bauböck 2007), engage in theoretical discussions on the viability of EU citizenship, the Europeanization theorists are more concerned with examining empirical data and establishing how EU norms and policies are affecting national citizenship institutions. On a conceptual level, that is also the aim of this thesis, as the discussion on welfare migration can be seen as a symptom of the EU’s introduction of an EU citizenship, securing the right to

move and reside freely within the EU. The next section presents the three models of the EU that provides the analytical framework for the analysis.

#### **2.1.4 Models of the EU**

In approaching the empirical analysis, this study will make use of three different models of the EU as a democratic polity. The three models are based on Olsen (2013, pp. 509–510) and envision the EU as a nation-based, a federal, and a cosmopolitan polity respectively. These models provide the analytical framework for the analysis, and have been chosen because they express different views on the dimensions of citizenship. Being clearly distinguishable from one another, they will allow for a well-defined and transparent process of identifying and filtering perceptions of welfare migration in the analysis.

While many opinions expressed by the no-demos theorists can be found in the nation-based model, the cosmopolitan model embodies many of the post-nationalist sentiments. The multinational federal model finds its followers in different theoretical camps.

##### **The Nation-based Model**

###### *Basic Principles: National Identity & Intergovernmentalism*

In this model, the EU would be rearranged so that ultimate and final arbitration rests with the member states. They would retain veto power on all issues considered significant for their continued political autonomy, and the reach of European integration would consequently be limited. The institutional system in this model would be strictly intergovernmental, as the member states would be the supreme “masters of the Treaties”<sup>14</sup>. It follows that the democratic legitimacy of the Union would be secured at the national level of the member states. The nation-based model fosters what Olsen (2013, p. 509) describes as “audit democracy” – a system in which important decisions may be made at supranational level, but where the constituent nation-states nevertheless have every opportunity of reviewing them. As for citizenship, the member states would be in complete control with regards to the designation of citizenship and with regards to setting the scope of rights and duties – at EU *and* at national level (Olsen, 2013, p. 509).

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<sup>14</sup> Grimm (1995, p. 291) refers to Oppermann when using this expression.

### *Conceptions of Citizenship in the Nation-based Model*

In the understanding of EU citizenship found in the nation-based model, *one* citizen is linked to *one* nation-state with *one* prevailing national identity (Schnapper, as cited in Olsen, 2013, p. 511). Advocates of the nation-based model contend that meaningful citizenship is contingent upon the nation-state, as the existence of a national *demos* is considered a precondition for democracy. As Linklater (1998a, p. 23) aptly describes it, traditional conceptions of citizenship like the ones found in the nation-based model are “anchored in the world of the bounded community; they contend that it loses its precise meaning when divorced from territoriality, sovereignty and shared nationality”; to be a citizen “is to have concrete rights against, and duties to, a specific sovereign state” and “to belong to a bounded political community which enjoys the right of collective self-determination, and which can decide who can enter its ranks and who can be turned away”.

Olsen (2008, p. 42; 2013, p. 511) argues that this type of beliefs have been present since the beginning of the European integration process and have contributed to the shaping of EU citizenship. One manifestation of this is the fact that access to EU citizenship is determined by use of the “nationality principle”, dictating that it can only be given to those already holding citizenship in a member state. The addition of a TEU provision<sup>15</sup> stating that EU citizenship is additional to, and does not replace national citizenship, is further proof of the importance of the beliefs embodied by the nation-based model. While the belief that ultimate sovereignty should lie with the member states is apparently strong, the existence of supranational rights (such as the right to move and reside freely and the right to stand for local and EP election in any member state) means that the member states have lost considerable control over their domestic policies.

### *Expectations about Perceptions of Welfare Migration on the Basis of the Nation-based Model*

People who have a view of European integration that is in line with the nation-based model are likely to believe that welfare migration poses a challenge to national welfare. From the nation-based standpoint, the extension of welfare benefits, and to whom they are bestowed, should be determined nationally. As nationality provides the main source for their identity, this is only natural.

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<sup>15</sup> In the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam.

With reference to the two basic dimensions of citizenship, the nation-based model of the EU places much greater emphasis on national identity and physical belonging than on rights derived purely from the legal status of citizenship.

## **The Multinational Federal Model**

### *Basic Principles: European Identity & Division of Power*

In this model, decision-making power and jurisdiction would be transferred from the national to the supranational level, and the EU would be reconstructed as a federal state composed of already existing nation-states. The system of decision-making would be top-down, but with clear boundaries between its composite levels – leaving no doubt as to where decisions are made. In the case of a conflict between federal and state law, federal law would take precedence. The democratic legitimacy of this model would stem from direct representation of citizens in all relevant spheres at EU level. A federal EU, as envisioned in this model, would be dependent upon the creation of a European identity (based on common European values) to provide the foundation for its institutions (Olsen, 2013, p. 510). Citizenship would be nested between levels, with clearly defined rights and duties at each level. Decisions pertaining to the granting of citizenship would be made centrally (Olsen, 2013, pp. 509–510).

### *Conceptions of citizenship in the Multinational Federal Model*

In the multinational federal model, EU citizenship is conceptualized as layered and varied. Because of the many national identities coexisting in the EU, Nicolaidis (2004, p. 91) argues that the EU is more of a “demoi-cracy” than a democracy, existing of *peoples* rather than a *people*. While having different national identities, members also share a European identity based on common values and European norms – there is unity in diversity. Being nested in a multi-level polity, it is quite easy to compare EU citizenship with citizenship in a federal state. While the fact that membership decisions are not taken at the central (EU) level is an important difference distinguishing EU citizenship from citizenship in federal states, it is also an arrangement which fits well with another feature of federalism – namely the accommodation of different political communities (Olsen, 2013, p. 513).

EU citizenship also displays certain features of federalism related to the separation of rights between composite levels of government. Among the civic rights of EU, there are some that are exclusively linked to the supranational, such as the rights to petition the EP and the EU

Ombudsman and to contact the EU institutions. Furthermore, the rights to stand in local and European elections represent supranational political rights that follow from the status of citizenship (Olsen, 2013. P. 513). While these supranational rights are central to EU citizenship, there are as yet no political structures corresponding to the systems found at national level. This lack of extension of EU electoral rights, Olsen argues, impedes EU citizenship since national parliaments remain important through the Council. Because EU citizenship does not entail full citizenship at the national level when residing in a Member State where one is not a national, EU citizenship is not “portable” in the federal sense.

#### *Expectations about Perceptions of Welfare Migration in the Multinational Federal Model*

Having a layered identity, adherents to the multinational federal model are likely to see themselves as both a member of a national community and the European community. Granting access to welfare benefits to other EU citizens should therefore not be problematic, given that the decision is taken at the appropriate level of government. The same goes for setting the scope of welfare benefits.

The multinational federal model gives emphasis to both dimensions of citizenship. While the European polity envisioned by this model holds a multitude of different national identities, it also relies upon a shared European identity (based on common values and norms) to function. Moreover, it presupposes a clear division of rights and duties at different levels of government.

### **The Cosmopolitan Model**

#### *Basic Principles: Personhood & Universal Rights*

In this model, the EU would be a “non-state entity based on cosmopolitan principles, universal human rights, and the rule of law; a regional subset of a cosmopolitan global order” (Olsen, 2013, p. 510). As such, it would separate conceptions of democratic governance and individual rights from the nation-state. In order to enforce compliance with cosmopolitan norms, the cosmopolitan model would have a decision-making system that would be loosely coupled and functionally differentiated on several levels (member state, European, and global). Democratic legitimacy in this model would be founded on an individual basis, and the integrity of citizens would be secured through the observation of universal rights and higher-ranking law. Because rights in this model are seen as innately individual and universal,

and not bound by membership in a nation-state, citizenship would be genuinely post-national (Olsen, 2013, p. 510).

### *Conceptions of citizenship in the Cosmopolitan Model*

Citizenship beyond the nation-state, as envisioned in the cosmopolitan model, is based on personhood rather than peoplehood. In this model, it is irrelevant which national (or regional) community a person belongs to. What matters is that rights are innately individual and universal. This model, then, completely breaks with the traditional understanding of citizenship as something linked to state and nation.

When it comes to cosmopolitan traits present in the EU, Olsen argues that the link between citizenship, nationality and access to rights and benefits has been weakened somewhat. There is a partial move towards the “personhood” criterion in terms of access to rights, and “the entitlement to rights...is no longer *completely* dependent on the status of citizenship” (Olsen, 2013, p. 514). Delanty contends that the Europeanization of citizenship can be seen as a gradual process of convergence; while total uniformity is considered unlikely, he nonetheless argues that “All the indications point to the pluralism of legal regimes” (Delanty, 2007, p. 67).

Delanty (2007, p. 67) also maintains that “The EU is one of the best examples of a polity that has given a concrete form universal human rights”, and that there is a blurring between national rights and human rights because migrants increasingly have been able to make claims on the basis of human rights. Furthermore, the exercise of free movement has to some extent resulting in the “person” taking precedence over the “worker” (see the *Martínez Sala* case discussed in Castro Oliveira, 2002, pp. 78–80). Freedom of movement is more and more often interpreted as a fundamental right (Somek, as cited in Olsen, 2013, p. 514). A development that also points in the direction of a cosmopolitan understanding of EU citizenship is the extension of certain social rights by virtue of residency (Constant, 2006, p. 76). This development has been the result of rulings by the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and show how EU policies are impacting national citizenship institutions (the theory of Europeanization scholars).

However, as pointed out by Olsen (2013, p. 514), the abovementioned developments with regard to rights do not extend to political citizenship and democratic participation in the national sphere. Instead, they are rights that are linked to movement between member states. As Bellamy (2008, p. 598) point out, “the rights conferred by EU citizenship are almost all

contingent on residence in another member state”. Moreover, Bellamy underlines that EU citizens’ right to reside in other member states than their own is dependent upon the ability to support oneself economically, and consequently is not unconditional. Factors such as these are why EU citizenship cannot be regarded as cosmopolitan.

### *Expectations about Perceptions of Welfare Migration in the Cosmopolitan Model*

From a cosmopolitan standpoint, welfare migration is not a challenge. Since everyone is a citizen of the EU/EEA (and of the world), it follows that welfare benefits should be equally available to everyone.

The cosmopolitan model of the EU stresses the legal status dimension of citizenship, with universal rights being the focal point. Identity is considered to be of little consequence, as everyone is seen to be a citizen of not only a country, but also of a region and the world.

Table 1 summarizes the empirical expectations related to the two dimensions of citizenship, measured as identity and rights.

**Table 1:** Expectations linked to welfare migration in the three models of the EU

	<b>Nation-based Model</b>	<b>Multinational Federal Model</b>	<b>Cosmopolitan Model</b>
<b>Identity</b>	Nationality provides the main source of individuals’ identities	Everyone has a national and a European identity	Everyone is a citizen of the EU/EEA (and of the world)
<b>Rights</b>	Member states should determine the extension of, and access to, welfare benefits.	The extension of, and access to, welfare should be determined at the appropriate level of government (be it national or supranational level)	Welfare benefits should be equally available to everyone working in the given country, as rights are innately individual and universal



## **2.2 Methodological Approach**

In order to analyze how different perceptions of welfare migration manifest themselves in public debates in Scandinavia, and what sort of view on European integration they represent, this study will make use of what is normally referred to as “qualitative content analysis”. Here, the term “idea analysis” will be used, as this is a more specific term for a particular type of qualitative content analysis. Idea analysis is “the qualitative analysis of the presence of ideas in text, where interpretation is an essential aspect of the analysis” (Bratberg, 2014, p. 57). It is precisely because idea analysis is well suited for mapping ideas in text, and for filtering them according to the context in which they occur, that this method has been chosen. The models presented above provide the analytical framework through which perceptions of welfare migration will be captured, filtered, and interpreted. This will provide the necessary grounds for comparison.

The first section below is concerned with idea analysis as a method. It begins by discussing ideas in general and welfare migration in particular. Then it goes on to debate why the study of ideas is a worthwhile endeavor and which types of research purposes idea analysis might have. The last section is concerned with the thesis’ research design, and discusses the choices that have been made in the construction of the analytical framework that will be used in this thesis. It also gives a brief account of the data analyzed.

### **2.2.1 Method**

Idea analysis is “the qualitative analysis of the presence of ideas in text, where interpretation is an essential aspect of the analysis” (Bratberg, 2014, p. 57). Bergström & Boréus (2012, p. 140) define an idea as a mental construction, which unlike volatile impressions or attitudes, is characterized by a degree of stability and continuity. Ideas can be of an individual or a collective nature, meaning that they can influence either one person/a smaller group of persons or larger ideological and political movements. Furthermore, they can be normative or descriptive. While normative ideas imply a valuation of some sort, descriptive ideas express assumptions about the world, and are often causal beliefs (Bratberg 2014, p. 58–59). The idea of welfare migration, as defined in this study, is descriptive and normative, as it assumes that migrants choose which country to move to on the basis of the generosity of that country’s welfare system.

Because assumptions cannot always be pursued empirically, they are open to political coloring (Bratberg 2014, p. 59). This holds true for welfare migration. Since there is much dispute among researchers whether or not welfare generosity *is* a determinant of migration, political players can easily give welfare migration a specific political hue. This is illustrated by Schram, Nitz and Krueger (1998, p. 226–227):

*Welfare migration has frequently operated as a powerful symbol often narrated in the policy arena in statistical form with the effect of undermining support for public assistance. Welfare migration stories tend to reinforce the symbolic power of depicting welfare recipients as illegitimate self-seeking people who are abusing the system.*

Bratberg (2014, p. 60) underlines that we daily encounter causal beliefs that are colored by fundamental political views. Because descriptive ideas often have a normative anchoring, the line between descriptive and normative ideas is not always as clear-cut as it first appears. In the case of welfare migration, this means that how a politician or policy maker view welfare migration will depend on their pre-established views on inter alia the EU and European integration, migration and the welfare state.

## **Purposes of Idea Analysis**

Describing ideas as the drive wheel of politics, Bratberg (2014, p. 57) maintains that ideas are what we should study if we wish to understand political players and their actions. In the succinct words of Mehta (2011, pp. 45–46):

*If, as Louis Wirth (1936) once said, the “most important thing to know about a man is what he takes for granted”, then the most important things to know about a society and its politics are its prevailing assumptions. Understanding how these assumptions became dominant, what role they play in determining policy while ascendant, and why they are replaced by other sets of assumptions [sic] should be at the heart of political science and political sociology.*

According to Mehta, ideas matter because they influence people’s actions.

*Ideas, broadly defined, are central to questions about agenda setting, social movements, revolutions, diffusion, policy choice, the conceptual categories that underlie politics, path dependency and path-shaping change, institution building, institutional stability, institutional change, voter identity formation, interestgroup [sic] formation, and political coalition building.*

(Mehta, 2011, pp. 24–25)

Idea analysis can serve several different purposes: it can be used to explain or to map ideas in text. If the starting point of the study is explanatory, ideas can be analyzed as either *causes* or *consequences*. If the starting point of the study is descriptive, however, the goal of the analysis will be to map which ideas occur and are salient in particular texts (Bratberg 2014, p. 60–64; Bergström & Boréus 2012, p. 146). Bratberg asserts that mapping is not about describing or reproducing content; it is about capturing and filtering ideas from continuous text. In order to do this, the researcher must have an ability to understand the context in which the text is produced — the analysis must be anchored in a prior knowledge of the text message or the sender of the text. Mapping also implies an element of comparison, where the ideas or perceptions identified can be compared to with those of earlier texts, with specific empirical expectations, or with those of other players.

Mehta (2011, p. 25–27) considers ideas at three different levels of generality that are relevant if one wishes to understand the policy process. On these three levels, ideas function as policy solutions, problem definitions, or public philosophies or zeitgeist. When an idea serves as a policy solution, it provides the means for solving a given problem and accomplishing certain objectives. Since problems and objectives are not necessarily pre-established, however, ideas can play the role of problem definitions. Mehta (2011, p. 27) describes a problem definition as “a particular way of understanding a complex reality”, and highlights that “the way a problem is framed has significant implications for the types of policy solutions that will seem desirable, and hence much of political argument is fought at the level of problem definition”. Lastly, an idea can function as a public philosophy or as a zeitgeist. As such, the idea is broader, and contains a set of assumptions. The difference between a public philosophy and a zeitgeist is that while public philosophies are contestable, zeitgeists are not open to criticism (that is, in a particular historical moment). If a public philosophy is sufficiently dominant, however, it can become the zeitgeist for a time. Whether the analysis will have an explanatory or a descriptive end, Mehta holds, depends on the part of the policy process one is concerned with, and at what level a specific idea is found.

### **2.2.2 Research Design**

In this study, the primary objective is to map existing perceptions of welfare migration — to analyze them as problem definitions. Since both the problem (i.e. the extent to which welfare attracts migrants) and the objectives (i.e. what should be done about it) are unclear, this seems

like a logical place to start. Furthermore, it appears to be a worthwhile pursuit since the bulk of welfare migration research has been larger quantitative studies that have not been concerned with identifying which perceptions of welfare migration occur and are salient in public debates.

Learning how different perceptions of welfare migration manifest themselves, and what they consist of, is of key importance if one at a later stage would wish to examine another part of the policy process. This could either be what a given perception of welfare migration leads to (functioning as a policy solution) or what larger set of assumptions a given perception of welfare migration is a part of (functioning as a public philosophy). Public philosophies are linked to what was mentioned earlier, namely that ideas are susceptible to political coloring.

Bratberg (2014, pp. 66–72) identifies two concrete ways of going about idea analysis: by use of ideal types, and by use of dimensions. These two techniques differ as to the level of specification of the analytical framework. When using ideal types, the purpose is to define a set of key characteristics that are specific for a class or category – to construct a pure type, an ideal, by which phenomena from the real world can be measured against. In the words of Weber (1968, p. 20): “The more sharply and precisely the ideal type has been constructed, thus the more abstract and unrealistic...it is, the better it is able to perform its functions in formulating terminology, classifications, and hypotheses”. When using dimensions, on the other hand, the starting point is less developed; phenomena are measured along one or several ideological axes, where two different ideas represent the extremes. While dimensions are often used in studies concerned with analyzing change over time, ideal types are useful when attempting to map an array of ideas, and when attempting to determine which ideas are the predominant. Since mapping perceptions of welfare migration is the main objective of this thesis, this study will make use of ideal typical models.

The manner in which a given study is structured has implications for the validity and the verifiability of the analysis. This study is deductively oriented since, as asserted by Bratberg (2014, p. 73), it is only natural that the analytical framework by which the ideas will be captured and filtered is developed before the actual analysis is conducted. A thoroughly developed framework, constructed on the basis of material other than that being analyzed, contributes to the testability of the analysis and increases the reliability of potential findings. Here, as mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the analytical framework consisting of three models of the EU is based on EU citizenship theory. In an attempt to make the analysis

as verifiable as possible, the analysis also gives a description of how relevant information has been sought out in the various documents.

The three models of the EU provide the framework through which the different ideas, or perceptions, of welfare migration will be captured, filtered, and interpreted. By use of the two main dimensions of citizenship (see section 2.1.1), the models will capture relevant information from all parties, which accordingly will be placed where they belong. This provides the necessary grounds for comparison, both within each country and across the three countries.

### **2.2.3 Data**

As a first step in uncovering which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate in political debates in Scandinavia, this thesis will analyze the party platforms of all the political parties currently represented in parliament. Bratberg (2014, pp. 74–75) states that if one is interested in a party's ideological profile, it is natural to study their public communication, such as election manifestos and more long-term statements of principles. Moreover, Bratberg maintains that as publicly known, often standardized documents, they are also well suited for comparison. Given the aim of this thesis, it seems pertinent to examine this type of documents.

Some advantages to party platforms are precisely that they are meant to express ideological essence and that they are well suited for comparison. A disadvantage is that while such documents express a party's official values, principles and standpoints on various issues, one does not know if the party lives up to these values and principles in practice (Ryghaug, 2002, p. 306). Which kind of policies a party actually pursues might be better accounted for by parliamentary debates or public statements.

Because party platforms consist of both values and actions, they are not necessarily found in one single document. For this reason, several different types of documents are analyzed in this thesis, including statement of principles, action programs and election manifestos from the also parliamentary election in each country (2013 in Norway, 2014 in Sweden, and 2011 in Denmark).

## **Data Collection**

The types of documents found in the three countries vary somewhat. This could potentially be a methodological challenge, as this study wish to compare the findings from the three countries. Nearly all documents analyzed from Norway are election manifestos published in connection with the parliamentary election in 2013. These manifestos often consist of both principles and desired actions that the parties wish to take should they be elected into government. Some of the parties have separate statements of principles, which have also been analyzed (the oldest of which is from 2007).

The documents found in Sweden are quite similar to the ones found in Norway. Nearly all parties have election manifestos published in connection with the parliamentary election in 2014. Most of the parties also have separate statements of principles (the oldest of which is from 2001) that have been analyzed. For one of the Swedish parties, adequate information could not be found in their election manifesto or other relevant documents. For this reason, some information from their website concerning their policies has been used in the analysis.

The documents found from Denmark vary more than in the other two countries. This is in part due to the fact that the Danish parties do not publish comprehensive election manifestos in connection with parliamentary elections, as elections are determined by the incumbent prime minister and announced only weeks before the actual election takes place. While many of the parties have more long-term statements of principles or party programs (the oldest of which is from 1997), it has for several parties been necessary to find additional information from their websites.

While there is some variation in the types of documents found in the three countries, all the documents analyzed are documents that express the parties' values and positions in recent time. The documents that have the greatest variation in terms of creation date are the statements of principles. Since these documents express fundamental values and principles, however, it is assumed that they remain relatively stable over time. The information found on desired policies and actions is generally more recent.

## 2.3 Concluding remarks

This chapter has presented and discussed the theoretical and methodological approach to next chapter's empirical analysis. In order to place perceptions of welfare migration within the larger discussion on European integration, this study makes use of EU citizenship theory. This theory is the basis of the thesis' analytical framework, which is made up of three different models of the EU. Idea analysis is the method that will be used, as it is particularly well suited for the aim of this thesis – namely to map existing perceptions of welfare migration and to interpret these according to the context they occur in.

A number of empirical expectations regarding how welfare migration is understood at national level can be inferred from the three theoretical models presented in this chapter. The central question is whether or not welfare migration will be seen as a challenge to national welfare systems. While people subscribing to a cosmopolitan view of European migration are likely not to see welfare migration as a challenge, people with a nation-based outlook are indeed expected to express concerns about welfare-induced migration. Which view adherents to the multinational federal model will take, is unclear. The next chapter will show whether these empirical expectations are correct or not.

### 3 Analysis

This chapter investigates which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. In order to get a broad overview of which perceptions of welfare migration exist, this chapter examines the party platforms of all parties currently in parliament in each country. Because welfare migration is a contested phenomenon, and consequently liable to political coloring, it is interesting to look at parties' official positions on the subject. More importantly, since these are the parties represented in parliament, their perceptions of welfare migration have the potential to influence policies.

By using the analytical framework presented in the previous chapter, the analysis determines how perceptions of welfare migration manifest themselves and which model or models of the EU best account for the different parties' views on the two main dimensions of citizenship (see section 2.1.1). Two aspects of these main dimensions, namely identity and rights, are seen to be particularly relevant when examining perceptions of welfare migration. This is because the manner in which a party regards identity – determining who belongs to a given society and who does not – clearly affects their view on who should be given access to rights such as welfare benefits.

Identity and belonging is investigated by looking at what notions bind a community of citizens together, how membership is framed in terms of belonging, and which characteristics are used to separate an *us* from a *them*. Accordingly, it will be particularly relevant to examine the parties' fundamental values, the society they envision and work for, and how they discuss immigration and integration. Rights are investigated by looking at their extension, on whom they are bestowed, and the degree to which they are exclusive. Since the context of this thesis is the EU/EEA, and perceptions of welfare migration are closely linked to freedom of movement, it will be natural to examine the parties' positions on the EU, labor immigration and the rights they believe labor migrants should or should not be given access to. The legal status aspects of formal membership criteria (used to determine inclusion in the polity) and participation (participatory rights and duties seen to be connected with access to welfare benefits) will also be briefly discussed.



## 3.1 Norway

There are currently eight political parties represented in the Norwegian parliament. A factor that might influence the parties' view on the different dimensions of citizenship is their position on Norwegian EU membership. In this matter, there are three wings among the parties currently represented in parliament: Those that are in favor of Norway joining the EU (the Labour Party and the Conservative Party), those that are against EU membership (the Socialist Left Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party), and those that take no official position and leave it up to the Norwegian public to decide in a future referendum (the Progress Party, the Liberal Party, and the Green Party).

### 3.1.1 The Socialist Left Party

The Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti), the most leftist party represented in the Norwegian parliament, clearly sees identity as layered and nested. In their declaration of principles, they state that in today's global world it is becoming increasingly more common to have multiple affiliations and to have a sense of belonging to several places. They underline that this does not necessarily have to mean that people are less loyal citizens of Norway, and argue that the Norwegian community should have room for many ways of being Norwegian (SV, 2011, p. 10). This view clearly fits into the cosmopolitan model, in which all citizens are seen to have multi-level, nested identities. Because multiple affiliations should be met with understanding, the party wishes to allow dual citizenship. Dual citizenship, they argue, is an important step toward a more open and inclusive society that is accepting of a population with affiliations to several countries and cultures (SV, 2013, p. 98). Furthermore, the Socialist Left Party explicitly states that they are against the introduction of Norwegian language proficiency and societal/cultural knowledge tests as necessary requirements for becoming naturalized citizens, as suggested by several of the other political parties in the Norwegian parliament. In the party's view, then, Norwegian language should not be one of the criteria by which formal membership should be determined.

In terms of rights, the party's election manifesto for the current parliamentary term (2013–2017) shows that they believe that everyone working in Norway should be treated equally in terms of wages and working conditions. They argue that a well-organized work life and robust labor legislation can hinder social dumping (SV, 2013, p. 27). This is particularly

relevant for migrant workers. They contend that everyone working in Norway must be protected against exploitation, poor wages and poor working conditions; policies that combat social dumping must be actively pursued in order to prevent the development of a subclass of workers from immigrant backgrounds (SV, 2013, p. 132).

Like their view on identity, their belief that everyone working in Norway should be entitled to the same rights and benefits – that rights be universal – suggests a cosmopolitan point of view. At the same time, while European labor migration is viewed in a positive light because it supplies Norway with skilled workers and new opportunities, they contend that the flexibility of the workforce in the EEA is often misused to force poorer wages and more unsafe working conditions. In order to ensure that Norwegian wages and working conditions are not undermined, the party wishes to have more control with labor immigration (SV, 2013, p. 127). Moreover, they emphasize that decisions pertaining to Norwegian working conditions should be handled domestically and not at the EU level. They state that it is urgent to ensure that the EEA cannot overrule collective wage agreements, that legislation pertaining to work and working conditions cannot be weakened by the EU, and that EU rules cannot set aside International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions that Norway has committed itself to (SV, 2013, p. 27).

Given these beliefs, it is not surprising that the party is critical of the EEA Agreement and wishes to replace it with a less comprehensive trade and cooperation agreement. They argue that the EEA Agreement promotes labor policies that make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to maintain the Norwegian model in the long run (SV, 2013, p. 10). As long as the EEA Agreement continues, they underline, Norwegian authorities must utilize the reservation clause<sup>16</sup> more actively. Of particular importance is preventing that ECJ rulings on the deregulation of the labor market are allowed to take effect in Norway (SV, 2013, p. 125). Instead of membership in a supranational union that has the capability to transfer power over important societal issues away from nationally elected bodies, the party desires Norwegian participation in an intergovernmental European cooperation scheme (SV, 2013, p. 125).

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<sup>16</sup> The reservation clause is a mechanism of the EEA Agreement enabling the EEA countries (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) to opt out of legislation coming from the EU. A reservation means that the EEA Joint Committee (Norway / Iceland / Liechtenstein and EU) have not reached agreement on a specific regulation or set of regulations from the EU. If the countries have not reached agreement within six months of the reservation, the “affected parts” of the EEA Agreement are suspended. See <http://www.europeiskungdom.no/hva-er-reservasjonsretten/>

### 3.1.2 The Labour Party

With regard to identity, Norway's Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) maintains that high levels of trust and a willingness for unity are important explanations for the development of the qualities that constitute the Norwegian welfare society – with small differences in living conditions, a universal welfare state, and a high level of participation both in the workforce and in civil society (Ap, 2013, p. 8). When it comes to immigration, the party argues that in a social democracy such as Norway, differences and diversity must be met with tolerance. Integration, they contend, “is a responsibility that the minority and majority populations must share. This responsibility is founded on a consensus on [sic] everyone having equal duties and rights” (Ap, 2013, p. 9). The party also wishes to introduce a Norwegian language test as a prerequisite for acquiring citizenship (Ap, 2013, pp. 89–90).

The party emphasizes that as a society becomes more diverse, it must be explicit about what its foundation is. Norwegian society, they argue, is founded on a set of common values that have been developed over a long period of time, including democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and equality. In the party's description of Norwegian society, it is these values (in addition to high levels of trust and solidarity) that bind Norwegians together – and make up the Norwegian identity. The notions that according to the Labour Party bind Norwegians together, are not particular to Norway as a nation. Rather, they are notions that are particular to social democracy. While the party sees language as the key instrument to integration, it is not considered a vital part of the *foundation* of Norwegian society. The party's view on identity, then, appears to be a cosmopolitan view that allows for multiple, nested identities. This is confirmed when looking at their hopes for a global welfare society:

*The Labour Party's fundamental values of freedom, solidarity and equal opportunities do not stop at national borders. We desire a global welfare society founded on active governments in which everyone has social security, employment and an opportunity to provide for oneself and one's family.*

*(Ap, 2013, p. 10)*

In terms of rights, the Labour Party, like the Socialist Left Party, wishes to safeguard wages and working conditions for everyone working in Norway. However, while in general having a positive attitude toward worker mobility in the EEA, the Labour party also identifies challenges connected to the increased influx of migrant workers, particularly following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements:

*Increased labour immigration has given us important manpower, [sic] however, in some segments of working life it has also resulted in problems associated with social dumping. Large-scale movement of manpower across national borders, combined with outsourcing tasks, is placing increasing pressure on the Norwegian working life model.*

*(Ap, 2013, p. 15)*

Unlike the Socialist Left Party, however, the Labour Party is much more positive towards the EEA Agreement. The Agreement, they contend, ensures equal treatment for both companies and individuals seeking employment or residence in European countries (Ap, 2013, p. 95).

*The EEA Agreement is positive for Norway and has contributed to strengthening the rights of many workers in Europe and Norway. The Labour Party will actively exploit the opportunities that lie within the agreement, to ensure that Norway will continue to have good regulation of working life.*

*(Ap, 2013, p. 15)*

The party underlines that they wish to work for a common set of rules in the internal market that respects the principles and rights that are valid in the Norwegian labor market (Ap, 2013, p. 96):

*We will seek to ensure that the new EU rules do not create obstacles to measures that Norway has introduced or plans to introduce, such as the plans of action against social dumping. It is particularly important to safeguard wage earners and workers who participate in cross-border establishments and services and to protect their collective rights including the right to strike.*

*(Ap, 2013, p. 15)*

In terms of welfare rights, the party expresses some concern for exploitation of the welfare system and argues that with the current changes in migration flows, a review of the current welfare legislation is necessary:

*Persons who earn National Insurance benefits in Norway may be eligible to take these benefits with them when they relocate to another country. With today's relocation flows, it is necessary to take a closer look at whether the regulations are in step with the new reality. In the development of our welfare society, we put more emphasis on services rather than [sic] cash transfers. We would like to link obligations to benefits.*

*(Ap, 2013, p. 53)*

That the Labour Party is more positive to the EEA Agreement than the Socialist Left Party is perhaps not surprising, considering that they believe that membership of the EU would be beneficial for Norway (Ap, 2013, p. 95). They do not state that decisions pertaining to working conditions in Norway should be determined in Norway. Rather, they suggest a more active role for Norway in the EEA, through which Norway could influence the rules and regulations that are valid in the EEA to bring them up to Norwegian standards. This view on rights in the EEA suggests at minimum a multinational federal view on rights, but more likely a cosmopolitan one. This view is confirmed when investigating the party's views on global relations and governance, as discussed in the election manifesto. The party maintains that working for international recognition of ILO's core conventions is still one of their main issues. Furthermore, they argue that free trade agreements must safeguard workers' rights and that they will make efforts to ensure that a requirement for good working standards and decent working conditions be included in a new World Trade Organization (WTO) round (Ap, 2013, pp. 93–94).

### **3.1.3 The Centre Party**

From the point of view of the Centre Party (Senterpartiet), trust, a sense of community and equality are described as the cornerstones of Norwegian society. The good society, they contend, depends upon broad popular participation in politics and society. A sense of community, they argue, presupposes that there are certain shared values, symbols and institutions that people have a communal affiliation to. A unifying national church, the monarchy, the public school system, and the Norwegian language are some of the institutions that the party identifies as sustainers of Norwegian identity (Sp, 2013, p. 24). Identity, then, is both unitary and national and a perfect fit for the nation-based model. Given the party's view on identity, it is not surprising that they wish to introduce tests in Norwegian language and Norwegian society and culture as requirements for obtaining citizenship (Sp, 2013, p. 32).

Because broad popular participation is seen as vital for the existence of the good community, the party opposes centralization, which they believe creates alienation and a loss of accountability. Unsurprisingly, then, the party argues that Norway must preserve its national independence and self-government and announce themselves as a party for those who support international cooperation between sovereign democratic nation-states (Sp, 2013, pp. 5, 24). What is more, they contend that a strong democracy presupposes a well-functioning nation-

state. Consequently, they are against the transfer of authority to supranational bodies such as the EU. They believe that the EU is gradually progressing towards a federal polity and this, they argue, offers representative government bad conditions. They also wish to terminate the EEA Agreement and replace it with multiple bilateral trade- and cooperation agreements. As long as the EEA Agreement is in effect, they argue, Norway must have a restrictive attitude toward the relinquishment of power to the EU through the agreement, and the reservation clause must be used actively (Sp, 2013, pp. 6, 34, 46–47).

In terms of welfare and rights, the party argues that there is a contract between the individual – who takes responsibility and contributes to society, and the state – that provides security and freedom, and that this contract is the glue of the welfare society (Sp, 2013, p. 25). In their view then, the welfare of the individual is linked to their contribution to the state. Because the EEA is perceived as a threat to the Norwegian welfare model, the party contends that Norway must opt out of EEA directives and regulations that threaten the Norwegian model (Sp, 2013, p. 48). While stating that labor immigration to Norway has contributed positively to the Norwegian economy and the development of welfare, the party underlines that it also poses challenges in terms of how the welfare state should be organized. They argue that the export of welfare benefits to EEA citizens who do not live in Norway, in particular, poses a challenge to the Norwegian welfare system – as large populations acquire welfare rights after only a short stay in Norway. This, they contend, challenges the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare system in the long term. For this reason, the party questions current welfare arrangements and argues in favor of more restrictive arrangements – and of challenging the EEA Agreement in this policy area. They also point to labor immigration as a challenge to wage formation in Norway, in particular in occupations where it is not necessary to master Norwegian. The solution they offer is better regulation on the part of Norwegian authorities (Sp, 2013, pp. 49–50).

The party's belief that Norway should opt out of EEA regulations threatening the Norwegian model, and indeed that Norway should be run by nationally elected officials, clearly points in the direction of a nation-based view of rights – namely that each country should determine the extension of, as well as who are given access to, welfare benefits.

### **3.1.4 The Christian Democratic Party**

The policies of Norway's Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkeparti) are founded on what they describe as the Christian democratic ideology, which emphasizes three fundamental values: the Christian view of humanity, love for your neighbor, and the responsibility of stewardship. While Christian values constitute the basis of the party's ideology, they clearly state that they support freedom of religion and wish to work for an optimal society for everyone (KrF, 2013, p. 11).

In terms of integration, the party (KrF, 2013, p. 105) holds that "The diversity that immigrants bring with them is an enrichment for Norway". The overall goal of integration policies should be that migrants coming to Norway feel respected and that they belong to the community, with the same rights and duties that all inhabitants of Norway have. At the same time, the party underlines that everyone who wants to live in Norway must support some fundamental values, including respect for human rights, democracy, solidarity, equality and tolerance. Because they believe Norwegian language to be the key to integration, the party wishes to introduce a Norwegian language proficiency test as a prerequisite for attaining citizenship. They also wish to introduce a test on Norwegian society and culture (KrF, 2013, pp. 105–106).

The Christian Democratic Party argues that the Norwegian community is bound together through the shared support for the fundamental values mentioned above, values believed to originate in the Christian democratic ideology. When accepted into the community, people belong by virtue of their equal rights and duties. The party does not make reference to any values or notions that are specifically Norwegian. Instead, their basic values are universal ones. The party's value-oriented ideology, then, is in keeping with the view on identity as found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU, in which people have multiple identities.

Discussing the Norwegian workforce, the party states that "Ensuring enough manpower will be a challenge in the near future". Continued labor immigration, they argue, will be integral to remedying this situation. In terms of rights, they wish to ensure that labor migrants have the same working conditions as Norwegian employees (KrF, 2013, p. 76). The party believes that most immigrants who come to Norway do so because of work or family reunion (KrF, 2013, p. 94). While having a generally positive outlook on labor immigration and migration in

general, they concede that the increased number of foreigners working in Norway has created challenges:

*The work immigration [sic] has also created increasing challenges for the work towards preventing social dumping. KrF wants everyone who works in Norway to have good salary and working conditions, regardless of nationality or what country their employer is registered in.*

*(KrF, 2013, p. 85)*

In terms of Norway's affiliation with the EU, the party argues in favor of a continued association through the EEA Agreement, despite the democratic challenges following from Norway's inability to participate in decision-making processes (KrF, 2013, p. 126). They do not wish Norway to become a full member of the EU, as this "might weaken our freedom of action in several important areas" (KrF, 2013, p. 125). While not wishing Norway to become a full-fledged EU member, the Christian Democratic Party's position on rights is clearly in agreement with the view on rights found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU. Though the party does not explicitly mention any sort of global order, the centrality of human worth and solidarity in their ideology is a good fit with the cosmopolitan belief that rights are universal.

### **3.1.5 The Liberal Party**

The Liberal Party (Venstre) describe themselves as Norway's social-liberal party. Liberal policies, they argue, combines personal freedom with responsibilities toward each other and society (Venstre, 2013, p. 4). The party's policies are based on an ideology that they summarize in ten principles: First, freedom for everyone, everywhere. Second, personal responsibility is absolute. Third, everyone has a shared responsibility for one another, for the environment and for future generations. Fourth, real freedom presupposes a sense of community and justice. Fifth, everyone is equal, but no one is the same. Sixth, politics shall further quality of life and human growth. Seventh, political power shall originate at the grassroots. Eighth, that power be distributed and balanced. Ninth, the liberal state is impartial, strong and limited. Tenth, liberalism is optimistic and always changing (Venstre, 2007, pp. 6–9).

In terms of immigration, the party contends that the opportunity to move freely is a fundamental right, and believes that the right to seek happiness for oneself and one's family should not be limited by place of birth (Venstre, 2007, p. 27). Having a positive outlook on



migration, the party argues that cultural and economic stimulus through immigration makes society stronger, richer and more diverse. At the same time, they highlight that migration also challenges society – not least when it comes to the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state. The party believes that everyone who comes to Norway should be given the chance to – and has a duty to – learn Norwegian and to acquaint themselves with Norwegian norms and society. The party wishes to introduce a requirement that applicants must be able to master a minimum of spoken Norwegian to acquire Norwegian citizenship. They also wish to allow dual citizenship (Venstre, 2013, pp. 88–90).

The party's ideology, their positive outlook on immigration and their wish to allow dual citizenship suggests a view on identity that allows for multiple, nested identities – a view that fits into the cosmopolitan model of the EU. This impression is supported by their positive opinion of the EU as an arena for economic and political cooperation and for peace and democracy building across Europe. While having pushed for the EEA Agreement, the party believes that the current situation, in which Norway is economically and legally integrated, but left standing outside of political decision-making processes, leaves something to be wanted. For this reason, the party argues for the democratization of the relationship with the EU through a more effective treatment of political issues in the Norwegian parliament. As for whether or not Norway should join the EU, the party believes that it is something that should be decided by popular vote (Venstre, 2007, p. 14; Venstre, 2013, p. 98).

Because the party believes Norwegian businesses to be dependent upon attracting foreign manpower, and that access to manpower is vital for economic growth, they wish to pursue labor migration policies that will make it easier for foreigners to come to Norway for work – both from within and from outside of the EEA. In terms of rights, the party maintains that everyone working in Norway should be entitled to decent wages, regardless of whether they are employed on a permanent, temporary or seasonal basis. The party also argues that the authorities and the unions must have effective systems to combat unacceptable wages and working conditions. The party wishes to introduce a national minimum wage as an instrument against social dumping (Venstre, 2013, pp. 58–59, 89). This suggests that the Liberal Party subscribes to a cosmopolitan view on rights and welfare – namely that welfare should be equally available to everyone.

### 3.1.6 The Conservative Party

According to the Conservative Party (Høyre), the Nordic countries are characterized by their open market economies, cooperation, equality and a high level of trust between citizens. Furthermore, the party contends that small societal differences constitute a Nordic value that is linked to Nordic culture and traditions. To maintain the values inherent in the Nordic model, education and welfare policies must “enable as many as possible to participate actively in social and working life” (Høyre, 2013, p. 5). The ideal behind the party’s policies is what they describe as “a society with opportunities for all” (2013, p. 89). The party believes such a society to be built on a number of principles, including confidence in the individual (who should be given the greatest possible freedom to determine how to live their life), diversity, freedom of choice, unity and solidarity, inclusion, subsidiarity, and rule of law (Høyre, 2008, p. 3).

The principle of diversity mentioned above is related to immigration, and seen as a source of new impulses and cultural exchange – contributing to new thinking, innovation and creativity. However, “While immigration has helped economic growth...there are challenges associated with immigration and integration” (Høyre, 2013, p. 94). Ensuring participation in the workforce and a good knowledge of Norwegian language, the party maintains, are the keys to inclusion in Norwegian society. For this reason, they wish to include language and knowledge tests as a part of the application process for Norwegian citizenship (Høyre, 2013, p. 94).

While the principles constituting the Conservative Party’s ideology are not particular to Norway, their emphasis on the Nordic model in describing Norwegian society does seem to place high value on a specific identity based on Nordic culture and traditions. Since a Nordic identity is not a national identity, it seems like the party does not accept the purely unitary view on identity found in the nation-based model of the EU. However, given the emphasis placed on Nordic values linked to culture and tradition, it does not either appear like the party supports the cosmopolitan view on identity. Given the party’s wish to join the EU (discussed below), it does seem probable that the party is willing to accept the view on identity found in the multinational federal model of the EU – that within the European region, individuals can have multi-level identities.

Discussing labor migration, the Conservative Party contends that Norway is dependent on labor immigration to ensure continued economic growth (Høyre, 2013, p. 89). While having a

generally positive outlook on the economic contribution of labor migrants, the party underlines that new migration patterns also challenges current welfare schemes:

*New patterns of migration are bringing pressure to bear on today's welfare schemes. The Conservative Party wants to ensure a satisfactory and sustainable welfare society also in the future, and intends to achieve this by adapting welfare schemes to the new, global reality.*

*(Høyre, 2013, p. 87)*

Because of these changes, they state that they will “Evaluate how welfare schemes can be adapted to new patterns of European and global migration” and “Consider measures that can limit the export of social assistance, but within the framework of the international agreements that Norway is bound by” (Høyre, 2013, p. 88). In other words, while accepting the EEA Agreement, they believe that as a result of increased European migration, current welfare schemes are liable to abuse. At the same time, the party argues that “Access to the EU's internal market through the EEA Agreement is a key precondition for maintaining the level of welfare in Norwegian society” (Høyre, 2013, p. 100). Moreover, they state that in the long term, they wish to replace the EEA Agreement with full membership in the EU.

While not making any explicit reference to labor migrants' rights, they imply – through their stated respect for the international agreements Norway is bound by (of which the EEA agreement is number one) and their wish for Norway to become a full-fledged member of the EU – that EEA citizens working in Norway should have rights. Whether these should be on par with those of Norwegian workers' is unclear. It does however seem highly probable that the party has a view on rights that fits well with the multinational federal model of the EU, in which EEA citizens' access to welfare should be determined at the appropriate level of government.

### **3.1.7 The Progress Party**

Norway's Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) describe themselves as a “liberal people's party”. With liberalism as their ideological starting point, the party places high value on individual freedom, and believe that most people are capable of making their own decisions and dealing with the consequences of those decisions. The party's guiding principles, they contend, are built on the Norwegian constitution and Norwegian and Western tradition and

cultural heritage, which are based on a Christian worldview and humanistic values (Frp, 2013a, p. 2).

In terms of integration, the Progress Party believes that placing demands on immigrants is to show them respect. They argue in favor of conditioning a greater number of social benefits on immigrants' willingness to integrate and to learn Norwegian. They contend that by making the completion of courses in Norwegian language and society as well as job training prerequisites for obtaining social benefits, Norwegian will be established as a shared language for everyone. Furthermore, they argue that social benefits to a greater degree should be attached to citizenship or "other appropriate delimitations". In order to acquire citizenship, the party wishes applicants to demonstrate knowledge about Norwegian society, adequate Norwegian language skills and the ability to provide for themselves and their family (Frp, 2013b, pp. 38–39). The party's vision of Norwegian society, with its emphasis on immigrants' willingness to integrate, suggests a view on identity in which nationality is central. As such, their point of view matches that of the nation-based model of the EU, in which identity is something unitary.

Discussing labor migration, the party maintains that Norway should be able to meet the need for labor within its own population. By making arrangements that stimulate people's willingness to work (for example by lowering the tax burden and getting more social security recipients into the workforce), they argue, this can be ensured. Any remaining need, they contend, can largely be covered by labor from the EEA. While it should also be possible to get labor from outside of the EEA, this type of labor should primarily be limited to work contracts of shorter duration (Frp, 2013b, p. 38).

While not taking a stance on EU membership, the party is generally positive toward further integration in Europe and supports finding supranational solutions to questions pertaining to a number of areas, including policy areas related to free trade, common competition rules and individual freedoms. The party underlines the importance of the EEA Agreement as a guarantor of Norwegian access to the internal market, and is in principle a strong supporter of the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. At the same time, the party stresses that the right to move freely presupposes that people who settle in Norway not automatically obtain welfare benefits, as this puts a strain on Norwegian taxpayers (Frp, 2013a, p. 8; Frp, 2013b, p. 34).

The 2004 enlargement of the EU in combination with the free flow of labor within the EEA, the party argues, has put pressure on Norwegian welfare schemes. Moreover, the rapid acquirement of welfare benefits and increased labor immigration from the EEA has led to an increase in the export of certain welfare benefits. Since Norwegian benefit payments are set according to Norwegian price levels and wages, this gives a comparatively high purchasing power in certain other countries. Because the Norwegian welfare system is vulnerable to high immigration, the party argues that it is necessary to find new solutions to ensure the system's continued sustainability and reduce the export of welfare benefits. In order to alter existing welfare schemes, the party believes that it is necessary to renegotiate the provisions of the EEA Agreement dealing with work and welfare schemes (Frp, 2013b, p. 58).

The party's dissatisfaction with the EEA rules regulating national payments of welfare benefits suggests a wish to reinstate stronger national control over this policy area. The belief that member states should be able to determine who are given access to, and the extension of, welfare benefits, indicates a view on rights that fits into the nation-based model of the EU.

### **3.1.8 The Green Party**

In their declaration of principles, the Green Party (Miljøpartiet De Grønne [MDG]) emphasizes solidarity – with people, future generations, and with animals and nature (MDG, 2015, p. 4). They consider all individuals to be equal, and contend that they will work for representative democracy worldwide. In order to ensure democratic participation, the party believes that decision-making power should be located at the lowest level possible – while still being effective (MDG, 2015, p. 6). MDG regards cultural diversity as a precondition for fundamentally free and viable communities. Diversity, they believe, functions as a buffer against intolerance, extremism and totalitarian regimes, and is an indispensable source of inspiration and renewal. While giving emphasis to personal freedom, they underline that they believe that solidarity and compassion should set the limits for individual freedom – and not vice versa (MDG, 2015, p. 5).

In the party's declaration of principles, there is no mention of a national community that is separate from the international community. Rather, they underline that they put the interests of the global community higher than national interests (MDG, 2015, p. 7). This suggests a view on identity that allows for multiple affiliations – a view that fits well with into the identity dimension as found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU. While displaying a

cosmopolitan view on identity, the party also wishes to introduce Norwegian language and societal/cultural knowledge tests as requirements for obtaining permanent residence and citizenship in Norway (MDG, 2013, p. 52). This is suggested in connection with their discussion of equality, diversity and tolerance, and appears to be a measure suggested to counteract discrimination.

In terms of rights, the Green Party believes in equal opportunities for all individuals. Furthermore, they believe the fair distribution of goods – between individuals, local communities, groups and countries – to be fundamental in ensuring that all people have the opportunity to live rich, safe and free lives. The party sees the principles behind the Nordic welfare model as a good starting point for this work (MDG, 2015, p. 7). The party makes no mention of EEA migrant workers' rights in either their declaration of principles or in their election manifesto. Nor do they explicitly mention their stance on the EEA Agreement or membership of the EU. Given their disregard for national issues and belief in equal opportunities for people worldwide, however, it seems safe to assume that their belief in rights for all workers would match that of the cosmopolitan model.

### **3.1.9 Summary**

A comparison of the Norwegian parties' political platforms shows a number of differences between the parties with reference to the research question. There are variations both in terms of how parties place in the analytical framework (i.e. which model their view on identity and rights fit into) and with regard to how welfare migration is perceived. As table 3 (below) shows, the cosmopolitan model is the dominating model in Norway on both dimensions. Table 3 also shows an inner consistency in the parties' views, with the placement on identity being the same on rights for all parties. This means that the parties' view on which rights labor migrants from the EU/EEA are entitled to are on par with their more general view on identity. The Conservative Party is an interesting case as the only party to place within the multinational federal model. As an in-between category, it is more difficult to determine which parties belong here. The Conservative Party is placed in this category because they emphasize a Nordic identity, which is not strictly speaking national or cosmopolitan. On the rights dimension, their multinational federal placement is due to their emphasis on adapting current welfare schemes according to "new patterns of European and global migration" within the framework of the EEA Agreement.

Table 3 does however hide a number of differences between the parties placing within the same model. With regard to identity, these differences are mostly related to formal requirements for obtaining citizenship. There is no pattern in terms of which parties suggest which requirements, as the proposed requirements are found among the parties placing in all three models. The Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party would like to allow dual citizenship. The Labour Party and the Liberal Party would like to introduce a language requirement. And the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party and the Green Party would like to introduce both language and Norwegian society and culture tests. The Socialist Left Party, on the other hand, explicitly state that they are *against* the introduction of Norwegian language and society tests as preconditions for naturalization. While there is no clear pattern in terms of which parties suggest which requirements (as the proposed requirements are found among the parties placing in all three models models), these requirements arguably reflect the parties' view on identity – as informal markers that are considered to be important for Norwegian citizens.

Regarding the participation aspect of citizenship as a legal status, some assumptions can be made on the basis of whether welfare migration is defined as a problem or not. The parties that hold a cosmopolitan view and that are concerned about social dumping are likely to believe that labor migrants contribute to the economy and to society and that they therefore should be entitled to the same rights as everyone else. The parties that see welfare migration as a problem, on the other hand, probably believe that labor migrants do *not* participate to the same extent as national citizens, and that they therefore should not reap the benefits of the national welfare systems. This is a situation that they in all likelihood consider to be made worse when payments (such as child benefit) is sent out of the country, and therefore not going back into the respective national economies.

With reference to the rights aspect of the legal status dimension, the study does not only show which view on rights the parties have in terms of the three models, but also whether welfare migration is defined as a problem. When comparing how the parties implicitly construe welfare migration in relation to labor migration within the EEA, two extremes present themselves: At one end of the scale, welfare migration is indeed seen to be a challenge –a threat to national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the other end of the scale, welfare migration is not perceived to be a problem at all. Instead, labor migration is seen to be problematic because it threatens workers' rights and leads to social dumping. This scale of

concern for welfare migration at one extreme and concern for social dumping at the other extreme corresponds with the scale that the three models of the EU make up, with the nation-based model on one end and the cosmopolitan model on the other.

When investigating the party platforms in terms of whether or not welfare migration is perceived to be a problem, a clear pattern appears. The parties that fall within the nation-based and the multinational federal model of the EU – the Progress Party, the Centre Party and the Conservative Party – are the parties that most strongly express concern for welfare induced migration and the consequences this might have on national welfare systems. The parties that express concern about social dumping, on the other hand, all have views that fit into the cosmopolitan model. In fact, all Norwegian parties with a cosmopolitan view on identity and rights (with the exception of the Green Party, which does not discuss labor migration at all) also express concern about social dumping as a result of labor migration within the EEA. But also two of these parties – the Labour Party and the Liberal Party – express some concern about labor migration affecting the sustainability of the welfare state. In Norway, at least, there does appear to be a scale on which concerns about welfare migration as a result of labor immigration is found at one end and concerns about social dumping is found at the other.

**Table 2:** Norwegian political parties' placement on the identity and rights dimensions

	<b>Nation-based Model</b>	<b>Multinational Federal Model</b>	<b>Cosmopolitan Model</b>
<b>Identity</b>	Centre Party (Sp) Progress Party (Frp)	Conservative Party (H)	Socialist Left Party (SV) Labour Party (Ap) Christian Democratic Party (KrF) Liberal Party (V) Green Party (MDG)
<b>Rights</b>	Centre Party (Sp) Progress Party (Frp)	Conservative Party (H)	Socialist Left Party (SV) Labour Party (Ap) Christian Democratic Party (KrF) Liberal Party (V) Green Party (MDG)

Whether or not the parties wish Norway to join the EU does not appear to be a decisive factor in terms of placement, as there are EU-friendly parties found in support of the views advocated by all three models. Similarly, there are two parties – the Socialist Left and the Christian Democratic Party – that are against EU membership and yet have a cosmopolitan



view on identity and rights. The parties' placement compared with their position on Norwegian EU membership might, however, be a reflection of the parties' view on the *manner* in which European integration is pursued in the EU.

## **3.2 Sweden**

There are currently eight political parties represented in the Swedish parliament. Regarding the Swedish parties' position on Swedish membership of the EU, all parties except from the Left Party and the Sweden Democrats support membership and wish Sweden to remain a member. These two parties, however, would like Sweden to leave the Union.

### **3.2.1 The Left Party**

Sweden's Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) calls itself a "socialist and feminist party on ecological ground". The party contends that everything the party does, it does in pursuit of one goal: to change society – by making men and women equal, by removing class differences and inequalities, and by creating ecologically sustainable solutions (V, 2015a). They believe that a country built on public welfare and solidarity is fundamentally stronger than a country in which market greed is allowed to run free. They argue that work, justice and democracy provide the foundation for a society in which everyone has a place (V, 2014).

The party believes all humans to be of equal worth and contends that everyone has the right to live a life in peace and freedom. They state that they refuse to adapt to racism and xenophobia, and accordingly support a generous and humane refugee policy (V, 2015a). In terms of integration, the party believes in a society that is inclusive and which offers everyone, regardless of background, skin color, gender or sexuality, the right to education, employment and housing – a society in which everyone fights together against discrimination. In order to capitalize on the experiences and the resources that immigrants bring with them, the party argues that vigorous universal welfare policies and individual solutions are needed (V, 2015b).

When discussing the values that bind society together, the party's main focus is on equality. They believe universal welfare and solidarity to be important tools in creating a society in which everyone has a place and everyone is accepted. They wish to pursue policies that will make it easier for immigrants to integrate into Swedish society, but do not mention a

specifically Swedish culture that immigrants would need to adapt to. Rather, their position that Sweden should be a society that welcomes everyone and that should be willing to make allowances for immigrants' individual needs, suggests a view on identity that would allow for multiple identities. The Left Party, then, appears to be an advocate of the view on identity found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU.

On the topic of European cooperation, the party declares itself as a party that is principally against the EU. They believe that the EU restricts democracy, and criticizes the EU for prioritizing the interests of the internal market over the environment, labor law, public health, and consumer interests. The party is opposed to what they describe as the EU's objective to build a new superstate, with a common foreign and security policy. They discourage any development in a federalist direction and work with the goal of bringing power back to the member states (V, 2015c).

With regard to labor migration, the party contends that it is something that is generally beneficial to Sweden. At the same time, they underline that a number of problems accompany labor migration as the migrants are often exploited and mistreated. The party contends that many labor migrants work for wages and under conditions that are significantly worse than those which are applicable in the Swedish labor market. Not least, this applies to a large group of posted workers from other EU/EEA countries. The party emphasizes that everyone working in Sweden is entitled to wages and working conditions regulated by Swedish laws and collective agreements, regardless of where they are born and where they reside. Work and competition, they maintain, must be on equal terms (V, 2015d).

In order to stop the exploitation of foreign labor and the dumping of wages and working conditions, the party argues that legally binding agreements on pay and working conditions must be in place. Furthermore, they highlight that workers who come forward about poor working conditions will not risk expulsion. These workers have the right to have their case tried in court and to obtain damages, and will be allowed to stay in Sweden to look for work for the duration of the original contract that has been breached (V, 2014).

From their discussion on labor migration, it is clear that the Left Party has a view on rights that fits that of the cosmopolitan model. The fact that they believe all people working in Sweden (regardless of place of birth or residence) to have the equal rights in the Swedish labor market, clearly demonstrates that they believe rights to be innately universal and individual.

### **3.2.2 The Swedish Social Democratic Party**

The Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) expresses a wish to create a society based on the ideals of democracy and on the principle that everyone has equal worth and equal rights. All people should be free to grow as individuals, to shape their own lives according to their own desires and to influence the community they live in. For this reason, the party sees equality as a precondition for freedom. As for solidarity, they claim that it is something that grows out of the realization that we are all interconnected (SAP, 2013, p. 4). Moreover, the party maintains that social democracy knows no national boundaries. For this reason, a global community based on the ideals of democracy is viewed as the ultimate goal (SAP, 2013, p. 5). The party's notions of community are not particular to Sweden, but to social democracy. In terms of identity then, everyone is viewed as belonging to the same world – a view fitting well with the cosmopolitan model of the EU, in which everyone is thought to have multiple identities.

In the matter of the EU, the party contends that it is necessary to change the Union in order to realize the potential it carries for European cooperation – both in terms of the direction of the EU's common policies and in terms of the way the EU is organized. With reference to common policies, the party wishes the EU to become a union for social justice, full employment and sustainable development. While affirming the four freedoms of the internal market, the party underlines that companies' freedom in the internal market must not come at the expense of the equal treatment of workers or at the expense of economic, social and environmental sustainability. The internal market must therefore be provided with a clear regulatory framework. Besides, the free movement of people in the internal market must be balanced out by workers' right to organize across borders and a set of common minimum rules in the EU that ensures the protection of workers' rights. In addition, the party wishes to develop a common European policy for full employment that is based on respect for workers' rights and that will help prevent social dumping (SAP, 2013, p. 27).

With respect to the organization of the EU, the party – while being a proponent of the subsidiarity principle – supports the continued development of EU policies in areas where the EU is best suited to provide solutions for challenges that are common to all of its member states. The party also argues that member states should be allowed to lead the way for better policies, for instance in areas such as the environment and labor law. The party maintains that the EU should to be an arena for intergovernmental cooperation between nation-states, and

rejects the idea of developing the EU into a federation (SAP, 2013, p. 28). The party also expresses a wish to work with the other Nordic countries to develop and strengthen the Nordic welfare model (2013, p. 28).

Considering that the party wishes the member states, through the EU, to develop common policies for social justice (including creating a regulatory framework for the internal market), suggests at minimum a multinational federal outlook on rights, perhaps even a cosmopolitan one. After all, these are policies that protect workers in the EU/EEA as a whole. Concerning welfare, the party does not explicitly state that they wish migrant workers and other EU citizens to have the same access to benefits that Swedish citizens have. Given how they discuss welfare and rights in general however, it seems fair to assume that their view on rights is indeed cosmopolitan. While the Swedish Social Democratic Party's view on rights appears to be cosmopolitan, they clearly state that they do not support a supranational EU functioning independently of the member states.

### **3.2.3 The Green Party**

Sweden's Green Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna) emphasizes unlimited solidarity – with animals and nature, with future generations, and with people all around the world. The party views society in a holistic manner, and considers everything to be interconnected and interdependent. Because society is for all and created by everyone, it must be built upon human rights and freedoms – where everyone has the same rights and is given the opportunity to contribute to society. In terms of diversity, the party believes that new ideas flourish in places where people and cultures meet and mix, where differences are respected, and where everyone is free to think and feel as they please (MP, 2013, pp. 3–4).

The Green Party proclaims itself as a party that is highly supportive of international cooperation. They wish Europe to be one piece in a world of democracies, in which people move freely across borders and where people and countries trade and cooperate with one another. They favor intergovernmental cooperation where countries voluntarily participate in decision-making processes, but are also open to supranational decision-making with regards to issues of a global nature, such as cross-border environmental issues and the protection of basic human rights (MP, 2013, p. 33).

While supporting international cooperation and supranational decision-making when necessary, the party also believes in the subsidiarity principle and that decisions should be taken as closely as possible to the people affected by them. Because of their skepticism toward centralization, the party is critical of the EU and any developments toward a European federation. They would like to see the EU develop into a more flexible partnership in which member states, within reasonable limits, can determine for themselves which areas to cooperate on (MP, 2013, pp. 32–34).

The Green Party's holistic view on society and their emphasis on solidarity – not only with Swedes or Europeans, but with people everywhere – clearly fits into the view on identity found in the cosmopolitan model. When investigating their opinions on labor migration, it becomes clear that the party also have a cosmopolitan view on rights. In terms of migration, they argue that freedom of movement should be a human right. They envision a world without borders, where all people are free to move, but where no one is forced to flee. Rather than supporting the belief that countries have a right to choose its inhabitants, they believe that people should have the right to choose for where to live, work and follow their dreams. While underlining the many positive effects of migration – for individuals, for society and for the economy – the party highlights that increased global migration also places higher demands on states to better facilitate migration processes (MP, 2013, p. 36).

Because the right to move is considered fundamental, the party wishes Sweden to be a country that is open for labor migrants. While they consider labor migration as a win-win situation for both the sending and receiving country, they underline that an open regulatory framework also requires national regulations and international collaboration to combat discrimination, poor working conditions and unscrupulous employers. Migrant workers, they emphasize, should have the same conditions in the labor market as other people living in Sweden (MP, 2013, p. 36). This clearly points to a cosmopolitan view on the rights dimension.

### **3.2.4 The Centre Party**

Sweden's Centre Party (Centerpartiet) contends that its policies are based on the fundamental assumption that all humans have the same rights and the same worth. For this reason, the party argues that each and every individual has the right and the ability to shape their own future, that making sure that everyone has the opportunity to realize their dreams is a

collective responsibility, that power should be kept close to the people, and that the planet and the ecosystem must be preserved, as it is the long-term foundation for freedom and prosperity. The party's liberalism, they contend, is social, decentralist and green (C, 2013, p. 3).

With regard to migration, the party aims for open borders, freedom of movement, and generous and humane refugee and immigration policies. They argue that for a political party whose values are based on the assumption that people have the same rights and the same worth, there can be no other logical position. Individuals' right to determine their own path, they contend, does not stop at national borders. Because of this, the party wishes to extend the freedom of movement to countries outside of the EU – so that it encompasses the whole world (C, 2013, p. 19).

As for integration, the Centre Party is a proponent of multiculturalism and believes diversity strengthens society. They argue that open borders breed tolerance and enable the exchange of knowledge between people living in different parts of the world. Sweden's opportunities to develop, they maintain, rise with increased exchanges with the outside world. For these reasons, the party wants Sweden to be a country that welcomes immigrants as one would welcome a new neighbor (C, 2013, p. 19; C, 2014, p. 12).

The party's emphasis on individual freedom, equal opportunities for all and openness to the world suggests a view on identity that allows for multiple and nested identities. When presenting their principles, they do not focus on any aspect of Swedish society that differentiates Swedish citizens from citizens of other countries. Rather, their discussion on migration shows that the party believes diversity and multiculturalism to be an advantage for Sweden. With their focus on open borders and freedom of movement, the party appears to be embracing a sort of global sense of belonging. Their view on identity then, seems to fit with that of the cosmopolitan model of the EU.

Discussing Europe, the party argues that there are challenges that necessitate a reform of the EU. The party's vision is a more open, more green and more humane EU, in which diversity constitute a collective strength. The party contends that the EU must do fewer things, but do them better. In areas such as climate, free trade, and cross-border crime, the party argues in favor of meeting common challenges with more powerful common policies. In other areas – member states' taxation, welfare, and social security systems being some – they maintain that the EU should not get involved (C, 2013, p. 20). With reference to the organization of the EU,

the Centre Party argues that the reigning principle should be that decisions are made as close to the citizens as possible – only cases that necessitate a joint decision should be made at EU level. They underline that the EU remains an intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign nations (C, 2013, p. 20).

On the subject of welfare migration, the party refers to their belief that all people have the same rights and equal worth. They contend that the Centre Party, more markedly than any other Swedish party, took a stance against talk of “welfare tourism” and against introducing transitional arrangements following the 2004 enlargement of the EU, and successfully stood up for freedom of movement for all EU citizens (C, 2014, p. 4). The party is convinced that Sweden benefits from openness to the outside world. Swedish prosperity, they argue, depends on the existence of well trained workers – a demand for which at present cannot be met within Sweden’s borders. Policies that facilitate and encourage welfare immigration, they contend, will strengthen Sweden’s ability to compete internationally. Access to foreign expertise will also enable Swedish businesses to continue to grow. Consequently, the party wishes to make it easier for small and medium-sized businesses to recruit employees from other countries (C, 2013, p. 19; C, 2014, p. 5).

The Centre Party has a vision of a more humane EU and argues in favor of making it easier for labor migrants to come to Sweden. The party does not, however, explicitly mention whether access to welfare benefits should be the same for labor migrants working in Sweden as for Swedish citizens. While their belief that all humans are equal in terms of rights and worth suggests a cosmopolitan outlook on rights, their belief that each member state should be able to determine for themselves which welfare and social security policies to follow suggests a view that fits into the multinational federal model of the EU.

### **3.2.5 The Liberal People’s Party**

The Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet liberalerna) contends that their mission is to fight for each individual’s right to shape his or her own life. The party believes that everyone has the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and argues that it is everyone’s responsibility to ensure that these rights are due to all. Moreover, they hold that it is the social-liberal mission to improve individuals’ chances in life by equalizing the conditions that are beyond the control of the individual. In addition, they maintain that respecting the equal worth of all means that everyone has the right to self-determination. Likewise, living in a liberal society

means to respect and tolerate different ways of living. The party sees the liberal community as something that is built and maintained by individuals working together. They argue that it must always be up to the individual to decide which community they want to belong to and be involved in. While tradition and cultural background may be important identity-builders, such factors must not be used as a pretext for denying or limiting a person's choices. In terms of liberal values, the party contends that they are international and universal, and that freedom knows no national borders (FP, 2013, pp. 3–4).

The party argues that Sweden should be an open country that welcomes new immigrants; a country where people – regardless of origin – work together to create a common future. Integration, they emphasize, is a mutual process that results in a sense of belonging. According to the party, language, employment, knowledge of the country and freedom from discrimination are the means and conditions necessary for this process to be successful. The party contends that to fully belong to a community is to accept the country's democratic institutions as legitimate and to abide by their rules. On the other hand, they stress that to belong to a community also means to consider its social relations to be a shared concern – to believe that everyone must participate in shaping the common future (FP, 2013, p. 18).

Applying for citizenship, the party contends, is the most obvious way of signaling that one wishes to be a member of the Swedish community. The liberalist concept of citizenship, they argue, is an inclusive one. They underline that that which is considered Swedish – what might be thought of as the Swedish identity – is not static. Traditions, social norms and lifestyles will always change, and knowing this, they maintain, gives a sense of security in the face of new influences. While they wish Swedish to be the shared language, they also see the need for providing information in other languages for newly arrived immigrants. In order to become naturalized, the party wishes applicants to demonstrate a basic knowledge of Swedish and to have completed a mandatory introductory program on Swedish society (FP, 2013, pp. 18–19).

The way the Liberal People's Party describes society as something that is continually changing and dependent upon the individuals that at each given point in time constitute the community suggests a view on identity that allows for multiple affiliations. Although the party wishes citizenship applicants to have a basic knowledge of Swedish and Swedish society, the introduction of these requirements appear to be based on practical considerations rather than a belief that immigrants must conform to a static Swedish culture and identity. The



party's view on identity, then, seems to fit well with the view found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU, in which all citizens are seen to have multi-level, nested identities.

On the subject of European cooperation, the party underlines that the EU facilitates cooperation on a number of transnational issues that are best dealt with in concert with other European countries. The party wishes Sweden to participate fully in the EU and strive to be a part of the EU's core. Their vision is a federal Europe that stands strong and united on issues where cooperation is needed, but that leaves other matters to be dealt with by the member states or the citizens themselves (FP, 2013, p. 32; FP, 2014, p. 12).

The party establishes freedom of movement as the basis of European cooperation. Indeed, their vision is that freedom of movement be recognized as a human right worldwide. They emphasize that work and entrepreneurial immigration contribute to Sweden's economic growth, and claims that foreign students and researchers strengthen Sweden's position as a knowledge society. They contend that both temporary workers and new citizens should be made welcome, and argue in favor of making it easier for people who are able to support themselves to come to Sweden to look for work or to start a business. The party mentions several groups of people that should be allowed to apply for a residence permit on the basis of work, including third country nationals, students and asylum seekers (who FP contends should be allowed to change tracks and apply for a residence permit as a labor migrant rather than as an asylum seeker). As for relatives who immigrate to Sweden, they underline that the provider must be able to support his or her family (excepting refugees, people who have already been living in Sweden for a long time, and parents seeking reunification with minor children). In terms of welfare, the party contends that general welfare systems should facilitate safe movement. Increased intergovernmental coordination is desirable, they argue, in order to avoid that both people who move between countries as well as people who live in one country and work in another risk falling outside national benefit systems, for instance in case of unemployment or illness (FP, 2013, p. 17).

With reference to globalization, the party argues that in order for Sweden to maintain its high level of ambition in terms of social welfare, a number of social liberal reforms are needed, including reforms that will make the labor market more dynamic. A social liberal work market, they contend, is characterized by high mobility in combination with robust social security systems. Foreign workers are seen to be an asset to the Swedish labor market, and for this reason, the party will defend foreigners' opportunity to come to Sweden. In cases of

cheating, they state that work permits shall be revoked (FP, 2013, pp. 3, 15–16; FP, 2014, p. 10).

While the party expresses a highly positive view on work related migration – not only in the EU, but in the world at large – they do not mention whether labor migrants' access to welfare benefits should be on par with that of Swedish citizens. They do express a wish for increased intergovernmental cooperation to ensure the wellbeing of people moving between countries and people working in a different country from the one they officially reside in, but do not offer any specifics as to which rights would follow from such a cooperation. That the party wants increased *intergovernmental* cooperation on – rather than supranational regulation of – welfare for labor migrants, suggests that the party believes welfare to be an issue that should be dealt with at the national level. From this, the party could subscribe either to the view on rights found in the nation-based or in the multinational federal model of the EU. As they are strong proponents of a federal EU, it is probable that they support the view on rights found in the multinational federal model of the EU.

### **3.2.6 The Moderate Party**

People provide the point of departure for Sweden's Moderate Party (Moderata samlingspartiet). Their policies, they contend, are based on liberal and conservative ideas that have proven to be successful in creating a prosperity that benefits everyone. The party believes that all humans have equal worth and an inherent ability to evolve. This ability, they claim, can only come into its own through freedom – and that is why freedom is the party's most central value. With freedom, they argue, comes the right to be oneself and to take responsibility for one's own choices, but also the obligation to respect other people's choices (M, 2011, p. 2; M, 2013, p. 3).

Discussing the Swedish community, the party states that they wish to build on values that many recognize as typically Swedish. Sweden, they contend, shall be a country that is modern, open and tightly knit. Moreover, they claim that composite and open-minded societies are more competitive than homogenous and exclusionary communities. Because the party believes that it is ultimately through work that people become a part of their new country and acquire knowledge of the language and the culture, the party argues in favor of an inclusive labor market. The Moderate Party emphasizes that a society that encourages

diversity must be clear on that which is common. That everyone has equal rights is a point on which they underline that there can be made no compromises (M, 2011, pp. 17–18).

The Moderate Party contends that “swedishness” is an identity that is available to people who live and work in Sweden. They argue that to be Swedish is to be allowed to be who you are, to be allowed to be different and unique. To be Swedish also means that one welcomes and respects differences in the certainty that there is always more that unites people than divides people. Sweden, they argue, shall be characterized by tolerance for different ways of expressing one’s identity and one’s solidarity with others (M, 2011, pp. 17–18). The party’s view on what it is to be Swedish is closely connected with their vision of freedom. To be Swedish, they argue, is to be allowed to be oneself and in turn to respect others as they are.

What binds Swedish society together in the picture the Moderate Party paints, is the recognition of freedom and equality as basic values. “Swedishness” is an identity that can be acquired, and one does therefore not have to be born in Sweden to be Swedish. Moreover, they contend that it is an identity that can be expressed in many different ways. The fact that the party stresses that people are free to choose how to express their Swedish identity and solidarity with others in the community, suggests that the party supports the view on identity found in the cosmopolitan model of the EU – that everyone have nested identities.

Concerning the EU, the party contends that it provides the basic conditions for asserting Europe’s political and economic interests globally. The EU is also seen to be essential in increasing Swedish trade and competitiveness. Besides, the party argues that the EU is a necessary platform for resolving common problems, such as threats to the environment and to the stability of financial systems. In respect of the organization of the EU, the party supports the principle of subsidiarity. They contend that while it is important that European countries cooperate in areas where cooperation brings added value, it is just as obvious that the EU does not meddle in issues that member states are better equipped to handle themselves (M, 2013, pp. 40–41).

The Moderate Party is an advocate of freedom of movement and a world without borders. The EU, they underscore, has enabled this vision to be carried out in Europe. The party supports the free movement of people, services, goods and capital in the EU, and argues in favor of deepening the internal market and facilitating exchange without borders and hassle. In addition, the party believes that it is important to expand the EU and to apply the principles of

openness and mobility to the surrounding world. They argue in favor of dismantling EU trade barriers against the outside world, and wish the EU to be proactive in persuading other countries to do the same.

In terms of migration, the party argues that the tradition of being open to the outside world is one of the most Swedish traits of all. This openness, they contend, is all the more important in a globalized world. If Swedish companies are to remain competitive and generate jobs as well as tax revenue, the party emphasizes that they must be able to easily find and make use of expert skill. Changes made to facilitate labor migration are therefore seen to be of great importance. Besides, the party believes that the ability to be self-sufficient is the key to successful integration and that work to be the best form of integration policy. Because of this, they contend that efforts should be made to further strengthen newcomers' opportunities to enter the labor market, to learn Swedish and to acquire knowledge about how Swedish society functions (M, 2013, p. 11).

The Moderate Party does not mention whether or not they wish labor migrants to have the same rights in the Swedish labor market as Swedish citizens. This goes for labor migrants from the EU/EEA as well as labor migrants from outside the EU. Nor do they say whether access to, and the extension of, welfare benefits to labor migrants should be determined nationally. Given their strong support of the four freedoms of the internal market however, it seems likely that their view on rights matches that of the multinational federal model – that it is something that should be determined at the appropriate level of government. Whether it is an issue the party believes should be determined at central EU level or national member state level, however, remains unclear.

### **3.2.7 The Christian Democrats**

The Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) contend that they work for a society where each person is given the opportunity to shape his or her own life and realize their full potential. This, they claim, is not something that a person does on their own. Rather, they argue that every person is dependent on the community to fully develop as an individual. The basis for the party's policies is the belief that human beings are naturally rational, which they argue provides them with freedom and with "the capacity for choosing between good and evil. Human beings are morally aware and are in control of their own actions, making them morally responsible" (KD, 2001, p. 5). The party promotes a society that combines freedom

with community and social responsibility. A society based on ethics and values such as accountability, trust, honesty, moderation and humanity (KD, 2001, p. 5; KD, 2014, p. 4).

With reference to integration, the party contends that there is an ethical base underlying Swedish society that creates favorable conditions for a multi-cultural society. While this ethical base is founded on Christian ethics and Western culture, they argue that it provides a uniting force for a society in which cultures, religions and lifestyles can live side by side to the benefit of all. In fact, they contend that “A multi-cultural society cannot function without a shared ethical base that is respected by both majority and minority groupings” (KD, 2001, p. 49). A central part of this ethical base is the respect of other individuals’ and groups’ worth and distinctiveness.

The party contends that people with an in-depth knowledge of their own culture are better equipped to meet other identities with an open mind: “Knowledge of how our Swedish historical background has led to the current community is part of the base that creates a strong individual identity... And it is a prerequisite for successful measures against xenophobia” (KD, 2001, p. 49). The party wishes to pursue integration policies that are characterized by what they call a “citizen perspective”, which means that “people shall have the freedom and possibility to organise as desired, such as by forming their own associations, start pre-schools and set up schools with ethnic base”. At the same time, they underline that immigrants must be guaranteed opportunities to learn Swedish and to acquire knowledge about Swedish society (KD, 2001, pp. 49–50). The party also wishes to allow dual citizenship, as they see citizenship not only as providing the basis for safety, rights and duties, but also as an identity marker signaling cultural and ethnic origin (KD, 2001, p. 17).

While the Christian Democrats argue that there is an ethical base underlying Swedish society that creates favorable conditions for a multi-cultural society, they also underline that the ethical base consists of Christian and Western values. This ethical base, they contend, must be respected by majority and minority groupings. This implies a Eurocentric view, fitting well with that of the multinational federal model of the EU – where people are thought to have a national and a European identity.

In the matter of European cooperation, the party contends that the EU is needed because individual citizens’ problems and opportunities to a great extent are dependent upon international conditions (KD, 2001, pp. 22–23). They underline that the peoples of the Union

are “united by common values based on our shared heritage from the Judeo-Christian tradition and from humanism” and that “The union today is based not only on these fundamental traditions, but also on convictions concerning the democratic system and human rights” (KD, 2001, p. 23). Regarding organization, the party maintains that the EU should have a constitution that lays out in detail how power is divided between the EU centrally and the member states, as well as a description of how decisions are to be made. Moreover, they argue that “It should be clearly established which areas are EU areas and which are not. It is necessary to define EU areas of authority in order to prevent unwelcome centralisation” (KD, 2001, pp. 24–25). As a general rule, the party supports the subsidiarity principle.

With reference to labor migration, the party contends that they would like to see more avenues into Sweden for people wishing to come there for work. They emphasize that labor migration is essential in order to meet the challenge of an aging population, both in Sweden and in Europe. They argue that foreign students who have studied in Sweden should be allowed to stay for at least six months to seek employment or start a business in Sweden. While the party would like to see more opportunities for foreigners looking for work to come to Sweden, they highlight that it is necessary to improve efforts to ensure that the system of labor immigration is not abused or exploited (KD, 2014, p. 22).

While the party expresses a positive outlook on labor immigration and would like to make it easier for foreigners looking for work to come to Sweden, they do not mention whether labor migrants’ access to welfare should be equal to that of Swedish citizens. Given their emphasis on common European values and their contention that individual citizens’ rights are dependent upon international conditions, it seems probable that their view on rights falls within the multinational federal of the EU – namely that decisions pertaining to welfare should be taken at the appropriate level of government. Whether they believe this to be the central EU level or national member state level is unclear.

### **3.2.8 The Sweden Democrats**

The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) describe themselves as a social conservative party with a nationalist ethos. In building the good society, they believe the preservation of the Swedish welfare state to be critical. They attribute the emergence of the welfare state, as well as the democratic and peaceful development of Swedish society, to a shared national identity. The party believes that this national identity must be safeguarded, and consequently

supports traditions and institutions that create and uphold a sense of community within the nation (SD, 2014). In the matter of governance, the party emphasizes that democracy emerged in a symbiosis with the nation-state. They see democracy to mean representative government, and express concern that representative government might be difficult to maintain in a state populated by several peoples, where there is no consensus on whom the members to be represented are. This becomes even more difficult, they contend, if the inhabitants speak different languages and there as a result is no common arena for debate. For these reasons, they see the existence of a common national and cultural identity in the population as one of the most fundamental cornerstones in a well-functioning democracy (SD, 2011, p. 6).

Because of the importance of culture in creating a sense of community and the viability of the nation, the party opposes multiculturalism as a political idea and as a social system. They contend that it is irrelevant for them whether the aim is to create a new, diverse community or whether it is to create a multiculturalist community in which several national cultures coexist within one state. Both of these scenarios, they argue, will lead to a worsening of the social climate – with increased alienation, segregation and conflict, and less security and welfare, as the results. Instead of pursuing multiculturalist policies, the party wishes to resume the assimilation policies that were the norm in Sweden before 1975 (SD, 2011, p. 21).

The nation has an important role in the party's policies and after family, the nation is considered to be the most important and most natural human community. The party defines the nation in terms of loyalty, a shared identity, a shared language and a shared culture. The party separates citizenship in the Swedish state from membership in the Swedish nation, but affirms that all citizens are equal before the law and have the same rights and duties. The party claims that best thing for the Swedish community is if as large a portion as possible of the Swedish population also has a Swedish identity (SD, 2011, pp. 15–16). While they would like as many Swedish citizens as possible to have a Swedish identity, they contend that persons not born in Sweden can become a member of Swedish society if they actively choose Sweden and adopt what the party sees as the Swedish identity. In order to be naturalized, they argue that applicants, among other things, must have lived in Sweden for a longer period of time, have proven themselves loyal to Sweden during this time period, have learned to use Swedish and gained basic knowledge of Swedish history and society. Furthermore, they contend that Swedish citizens should not be allowed hold any other citizenship, and that only Swedish citizens should be allowed to vote in general elections (SD, 2014, p. 16).

The centrality of a shared national identity in the party's beliefs and policies clearly indicates a view that resonates with the identity dimension found in the nation-based model of the EU. For the Sweden Democrats, nationality provides the main source of a Swede's identity. A shared identity, a shared culture and a shared language, in addition to loyalty to the Swedish nation, is how the party differentiates Swedes from other group. Their view on identity is a unitary one which does not allow for nested identities or membership anywhere else than in the Swedish nation-state. The formal requirements that the party wishes to introduce in order for foreigners to become naturalized further strengthens this impression.

The emphasis on identity and belonging is also evident in how the party considers Sweden's relations with Europe and the world. The party regards the Swedish population to be, in descending order, a part of a Nordic, European, Western and global community. In order to preserve Swedish independence and democracy, they argue in favor of intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign nation-states. The party is highly skeptical of any form of supranational cooperation, including the EU. For this reason, they wish to hold a new referendum on Swedish membership of the EU – with the objective to leave the Union and return to intergovernmental cooperation (SD, 2011, p. 43; SD, 2014, p. 20).

As regards labor immigration, the party sees it as a means to temporarily compensate for a poorly matched labor market and a method to resort to when the number of jobs temporarily exceeds the Swedish workforce. Because of this, the party wishes to abolish general labor migration in favor of a model where workers can obtain temporary resident permits linked to the needs in the labor market. Moreover, they contend that large long-distance migrations might have adverse effects on society as a result of the increased cultural heterogeneity, and therefore should be avoided (SD, 2011, p. 33).

Considering that the party wishes to limit labor migration to Sweden, to adjust labor immigration according to the needs of the Swedish labor market, and to leave the EU and change the system through which labor migrants obtain residency, it seems fair to conclude that the Sweden Democrats would not like labor migrants to have the same rights as Swedish citizens in the Swedish labor market. This is a view that is strengthened by the fact that they argue in favor of restricting access to welfare benefits for migrant during their first few years in Sweden. The party's view on rights, then, is firmly placed within the nation-based model of the EU, in which member states are free to determine the extension of welfare benefits.



### 3.2.9 Summary

Comparing Sweden's political parties' views on identity and rights reveals an interesting pattern: All parties except from the Christian Democrats and the Sweden Democrats have a cosmopolitan view on identity – believing that people should be allowed to have nested identities. However, as table 4 (below) shows, only the Left Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and the Green Party also have a cosmopolitan view on rights. The other parties with a cosmopolitan view on identity – the Centre Party, the Liberal People's Party and the Moderate Party – all have a multinational federal view on rights. This inconsistency in placement on the two dimensions is interesting: While the parties emphasize openness and tolerance in their discussions of society, the policies they wish to pursue with reference to labor migration indicates that their views are in fact less tolerant. Given that the documents analyzed express the parties' official values, the mismatch could reflect a desire on the part of the parties (for some reason or other) to appear more open than they in fact are.

Among the parties placing in the multinational federal model on the rights dimension, there is some unclarity concerning whether welfare policies should be determined at EU level or at national level. While all parties express a positive opinion regarding free movement within the EU, the Centre Party and the Liberal People's Party argue that access to welfare should be determined nationally. The Moderate Party and the Christian Democrats do not make a statement about this, but underline that it is important that there be a clear division of power in terms of which policy areas are EU areas and which are not.

In terms of whether welfare migration is perceived to be a challenge or not, the Christian Democrats is the only party to express concern for the misuse of the system of labor immigration in the material analyzed. The Left Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, and the Green Party, on the other hand, express concern for social dumping. The remaining parties makes no reference to either labor immigration as welfare migration (i.e. as a threat to the Swedish welfare system) or as a problem of social dumping.

**Table 3:** Swedish political parties' placement on the identity and rights dimensions

	<b>Nation-based Model</b>	<b>Multinational Federal Model</b>	<b>Cosmopolitan Model</b>
<b>Identity</b>	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Christian Democrats (KD)	Left Party (V) Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) Green Party (MD) Centre Party (C) Liberal People's Party (FP) Moderate Party (M)
<b>Rights</b>	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Centre Party (C)* Liberal People's Party (FP) Moderate Party (M) Christian Democrats (KD)	Left Party (V) Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) Green Party (MD)

\*The Centre Party could potentially have a cosmopolitan view on rights.

While several of the Swedish parties are critical of developments in the EU and see a need for a change of direction with regard to EU policies, only the Left Party expressly state that they are principally against Swedish membership of the Union. This does not, however, affect their cosmopolitan view on identity or rights. In fact, their opposition to EU membership is party caused by the belief that the EU places the interests of the internal market above labor law. That there are four parties that express a multinational federal view on rights, however, could be a result of generally positive attitudes toward Swedish EU membership.

### 3.3 Denmark

There are currently nine political parties represented in the Danish parliament. With regard to position on Danish membership of the EU, the Red-Green Alliance is the only party that wishes Denmark to leave the Union.

#### 3.3.1 The Red-Green Alliance

The Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne) is a socialist, feminist and green party. Their values are based on the belief that all humans are equal and that no one should be oppressed on the basis of gender, sexuality or ethnicity. They maintain that in capitalist class societies there will always be inequality, poverty, destruction of nature, and extreme concentration of power over capital, which undermines democratically elected bodies. Accordingly, they wish to fundamentally change society by replacing capitalism with socialist

democracy. The socialist society they work for is one that is founded on democracy, equality and solidarity, and that is ecologically sustainable (Enhedslisten, 2014). Concerning the international community, the party encourages international solidarity and joint organization and activity across borders (Enhedslisten, 2011).

When discussing society, the party's focus is on socialist values rather than values that are specifically Danish. When separating a "we" from a "them", the "we" is not Danish people, but rather socialists everywhere. Since the party clearly does not consider identity to be linked to nationality, it seems probable that they have a cosmopolitan view on the identity dimension.

In terms of welfare, the Red-Green Alliance contends that the current system of welfare is under massive pressure due to the globalization of the economy – of which the EU is an expression. As regards labor migration, the party states that when the workforce is allowed and encouraged to flow freely between countries, it simply becomes more difficult to maintain collective schemes for everyone living in a given country. Moreover, they argue that increasing control over fiscal policy on the part of the EU means that the consideration for the internal market is placed above the interests of consumers, general health and the environment. This, they maintain, hinders the introduction of improvements that could counter the forces of the market. Because the party believes the EU to put pressure on democracy, in addition to letting capitalist forces run loose, they would like Denmark to leave the Union. They also support the dismantlement of the EU as well as the creation of a green, socialist and democratic cooperation scheme (Enhedslisten, 2014).

With reference to foreign labor, the Red-Green Alliance maintains that thousands of Danish masons, carpenters and other tradesmen are unemployed because a growing group of employers sees fit to replace them with underpaid and unorganized workers imported from abroad. This is a problem not only for the individual craftsman, they contend, but also for society as a whole – as the exploitation of foreign labor results in great losses in tax revenue. While stating that they bid labor migrants welcome, they underline that it is an absolute requirement that the work is carried out in accordance with collective agreements, and that regulations on working condition, tax and VAT are observed (Enhedslisten, 2011, p. 8).

The Red-Green Alliance underlines that any work done in Denmark must be carried out according to Danish collective agreements and work market regulations. With this in mind, it

seems probable that they also believe labor migrants should have the same rights as Danes when working in Denmark, indicating a cosmopolitan view also on rights.

### **3.3.2 The Socialist People's Party**

Denmark's Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) maintains that their basis is a democratic and decentralist socialism, inspired by an undogmatic Marxist understanding of society. In addition, they highlight the Danish tradition for autonomy as well as the humanistic and cultural radical<sup>17</sup> traditions that emphasize human freedom, expression and responsibility. The party wishes to bring about a fundamental change of Denmark, Europe and the world, based on community-based values. This they intend to do by bringing together the general public in an alliance pushing for changes that will expand democracy, strengthen feelings of community, promote equality, and ensure sustainability. The goal, they hold, is to establish a socialist society that on a sustainable foundation creates the maximum amount of welfare, prosperity, freedom, and opportunities for all (SF, 2012, pp. 1–3).

The core values of the Socialist People's Party are equality, community, safety and global responsibility (SF, 2011, p. 2). The party considers all people to be equal, and argue that the free and all-round development of individuals should be both the goal and the means for the development of society as a whole. Everyone should therefore have the freedom and opportunity to realize the life of their dreams, while respecting other people's freedom, society and nature. In terms of how society is sustained, the party argues that social cohesion is about ensuring that the distance between people is not too large. Creating social cohesion, they contend, requires a high degree of equality, trust, safety and tolerance. Moreover, they maintain that social and economic rights are the glue of society (SF, 2012, pp. 1–3).

With reference to the global community, the Socialist People's Party maintains that socialism is international. They argue that social inequality, oppression, destruction of nature, inequality, and climate and environmental problems around the world are problems that concern everyone. The party therefore wishes to build alliances with like-minded people all over the world and show solidarity with oppressed people and their fight for democracy and human rights. This solidarity includes fighting imperialism and colonialism that hinder the

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<sup>17</sup> The values most commonly associated with cultural radicalism are inter alia criticism of religion, opposition to social norms, criticism of Victorian sexual morality, anti-militarism and openness to new cultural input.

independent development of poor countries – the Socialist People’s Party opposes any kind of national, cultural or ethnic chauvinism (SF, 2012, p. 4).

While not discussing immigration or integration in neither their election manifesto nor their statement of principles, the party’s emphasis on equality, freedom and tolerance suggests a view on identity that allows for different ways of being Danish and nested identities – a cosmopolitan view. This impression is strengthened when considering that high degrees of equality, trust and tolerance are seen to be essential in creating social cohesion and binding society together. That the party holds a cosmopolitan view on identity is further supported by the fact that they oppose any kind of national, cultural or ethnic chauvinism.

With reference to the outside world, the Socialist People’s Party states that international cooperation is needed in the global development of international law, human rights, social rights, environmental protection, and peace. The party supports Danish membership of the EU, and wishes to develop the Union into a binding political and economic cooperation between independent states. The EU, they maintain, shall counter nationalism, secure the foundation for work, welfare and green growth, create cohesion across Europe, and be a political counterweight against unregulated capitalism (SF, 2012, p. 4).

Regarding social dumping as a result of increased labor immigration, the party states that they will not accept underpayment and dangerous and illegal working conditions in the Danish labor market. They contend that they will work to secure Danish pay at all Danish workplaces. Moreover, they argue that conditions in the workplace must be equal, so that foreigners coming to Denmark to work are hired in accordance with the terms and conditions set by collective agreements. What it is about, they argue, is both preserving the unique Danish collective bargaining model and defending workers’ conditions (SF, 2011, p. 12).

It is clear that the Socialist People’s Party believes that foreigners working in Denmark should be guaranteed equal pay and working conditions as Danish workers. While not explicitly saying anything about access to welfare, it seems safe to assume that welfare for labor migrants would follow from their being secured the same working conditions as Danish workers. The Socialist People’s Party, then, expresses a cosmopolitan view on rights.

### 3.3.3 The Social Democrats

The founding values of Denmark's Social Democrats' (Socialdemokratiet [A]) are freedom, equality and solidarity. The party has three main objectives: First, to ensure that all individuals have the freedom and security to use their abilities and realize their dreams. Second, to ensure that people – regardless of social, religious or ethnic background – have the right and opportunity to live and to be an active citizen in a just and democratic society that is socially, environmentally and economically sustainable. Third, to spread democracy, democratic socialism, global equality, international solidarity, and security (Socialdemokraterne, 2011, pp. 4–5).

With reference to society, the Social Democrats underline that all citizens have rights and duties and that everyone has a responsibility toward themselves, toward one another, and toward the community. Moreover, they argue that Danish communities have a responsibility in terms of being open and inclusive toward their surroundings – to meet other cultures by valuing diversity and demonstrating openness and tolerance. In this connection, the party underlines that just as a person with a strong identity has the courage to meet other people with an open mind, a society with a strong shared culture has the courage to meet the world. They underline that all Danes share Danish culture, and that Danish culture shapes Danish values, the Danish way of life, and provides Danes a point of reference in the world. The better one knows oneself, they argue, the better one is able to meet and understand other people's culture (Socialdemokraterne, 2011, p. 12).

The Social Democrats state that globalization and immigration challenges the common and fundamental values of Danish society. In meeting with other cultures, the Social Democrats wish to safeguard certain fundamental values, among which are civic participation, equality and equal treatment of men and women, democracy, as well as broadmindedness, tolerance and respect for that which is different. While they believe that ethnic minorities enrich Danish society, they emphasize that they do not wish Denmark to develop into a society where large populations live isolated from the rest of society with their own norms and values and without any incentive to take part in the commitments and the community that constitutes the foundation of Danish society. Integration is therefore considered crucial. However, the party underlines that integration is not related to religion, way of dressing or eating habits. Rather, it means that immigrants are able to function in society on par with others – with the duties, rights and opportunities that a democratic society is built upon. Because the Social Democrats

believe that it is important to know one's own culture (in order to be open and fight intolerance and isolationism), they wish to strengthen the knowledge and understanding of Danish culture, language and history (Socialdemokraterne, 2011, p. 12).

The Social Democrats' emphasis on openness, broadmindedness and tolerance suggests a liberal, cosmopolitan view on identity. While they underline the importance of knowing one's own culture and a voice a wish to strengthen the knowledge of Danish culture, language and history, they underline that integration is not about adopting everything Danish, but rather about participating in society. People belong, then, because they take part and contribute to society. People also belong because they respect and cherish the fundamental values of Danish society. These are, however, values that are universal to social democracies everywhere, and not to Denmark.

On the topic of Europe, the party maintains that people's welfare and influence should be at the center of European cooperation. They contend that many of the challenges of today cannot be solved by individual nation-states. This applies to all problems that cross national borders, such as unemployment, pollution, crime and terror. Challenges such as these, they argue, must be solved at either European or global level. Moreover, they maintain that a new world order is needed. Because they would like the EU to take on social leadership in the world economy, they argue in favor of a more integrated common European foreign and security policy. Europe, they claim, shall be built on a social market economy. This economy must remain competitive in order to create new jobs, but it must do so in a socially and environmentally sustainable manner. The Social Democrats believe that it is in Denmark's interest to participate fully in the EU. They emphasize that a stronger EU that is capable of taking action is not a threat to the welfare society, but rather a precondition for its long-term survival (Socialdemokraterne, 2011, pp. 13–14).

With reference to welfare tourism, the Social Democrats states that foreigners are welcome in Denmark if they come to work under Danish conditions – but not if they come solely for the purpose of exploiting Danish welfare services. With reference to foreigners' right to receive child benefit when working in Denmark, they maintain that the party is working (in the EU) for the indexation of child benefit, so that the check workers receive correspond to the economic conditions of their home country. At the same time, they underline that they guard the ability to move freely and contend that the ability to work and live in a different country than one's own is an essential part of European cooperation. Freedom of movement, they

contend, has created many jobs in Denmark – with the result that thousands of families have jobs to go to and the ability to be self-sufficient. The rules regulation freedom of movement, the party maintains, are rules that Denmark profits from. While it is important that other EU countries follow these rules, it is likewise important that Denmark lives up to its commitments and provides people with the services they have a legal right to (Socialdemokraterne, 2015a). With reference to social dumping, the Social Democrats point to problems with poor wages and working conditions, in particular for Eastern European workers. While these workers are paid better than they would be at home, the party underlines that the acceptance of these conditions has direct consequences for Danish workers who follow the rules of the Danish labor market. The party therefore works against social dumping (Socialdemokraterne, 2015b).

In terms of welfare for labor migrants, it is clear that the Social Democrats feel bound by the rules and regulations that guarantee foreigners rights when working in Denmark. While they believe that it is right that these workers have rights, they explicitly refer to "welfare tourism" and underline that they will not accept foreigners who come to Denmark with the objective of exploiting the Danish welfare system. With reference to social dumping, they stress that the exploitation of foreign labor has negative effects on Danish workers and the Danish labor market. When considering that the party supports European regulation on labor migration, a view on rights that matches that of the multinational federal model of the EU seems probable. This impression is strengthened by the fact that while the party supports EU rules, they also wish to establish a system of indexation of child benefit – in effect treating national and foreign citizens differently. This is a point of view which does not fit into the cosmopolitan model – in which people's rights are seen to be universal.

### **3.3.4 Venstre**

Denmark's Venstre (full name Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti) has a liberal view of humanity, and believes that people thrive when they are free. At the same time, they argue that with freedom comes responsibility. Their view on freedom then, posits responsibility onto individuals – who must take responsibility for their own life, but who also have a shared responsibility for other people and for the community. Venstre maintains that when the individual is given the greatest possible freedom to strive after a good life, resources that can benefit society are created. They emphasize that there is no inherent contradiction between freedom and community. Rather, they contend that the strongest communities are those where



people voluntarily have joined forces to solve a puzzle or cultivate an interest. Venstre also maintains that broadmindedness is an important part of the liberal mentality. Broadmindedness in their view means that while you might have a firm conviction that you are willing to fight for, you are also willing to fight for the right of others to have a different opinion (Venstre, 2006, pp. 3–4).

Discussing Danish society, Venstre ascertains that it is based on values founded on Christian beliefs as well as a number of rights and principles such as individual freedom, care for the weakest members of society, equality before the law, equality between the sexes, limited government, democracy, independent courts, freedom of speech, and a separation of religion and politics. It is by virtue of these values, they argue, that individuals are free to choose their own way of life – while respecting others’ right to do the same. The freedom to determine one’s own path means that while one is free to join forces with others in all kinds of voluntary communities, one is equally free to leave these communities (Venstre, 2006, pp. 9–10).

As for the outside world, Venstre underlines that in the open and free meeting with foreign cultures, Danes should be aware that their worldview stems from Denmark and that which is Danish. The party argues that it is important that Danes know their cultural roots so as to avoid becoming victims of manipulation or ideological fashions. With regard to citizenship, Venstre maintains that everyone who wishes to make an effort is welcome to come live and work in Denmark. As for naturalization, the party argues that foreigners who wish to apply for citizenship (with the rights that follows from citizenship status) must master Danish, know Danish society, Danish culture and history as well as prove that they are able to contribute to society and provide for themselves (Venstre, 2006, p. 10).

In their discussion on meetings with foreign cultures, the party gives quite a bit of emphasis to that which is Danish, suggesting a unitary view on identity – fitting into the nation-based model of the EU. This view is strengthened by the party’s insistence that citizenship applicants must master Danish and have knowledge about Danish society, culture and society.

On the subject of European cooperation, Venstre establishes the EU as a union of independent European nations that have determined to solve a variety of tasks together. They emphasize the importance of individual Europeans’ ability to freely choose where to live, work and travel in Europe (Venstre, 2006, pp. 38, 42). As for organization of the EU, Venstre argues in favor of the subsidiarity principle. They also highlight the need for a clear division of labor in

the EU; member states should seek common solutions on issues where cooperation offers obvious advantages. While the EU should deal with transnational issues such as terror, international crime, and the environment, they contend that the EU should not get involved in areas such as social or cultural policy. Venstre would like Denmark to be an initiator in, and a fully integrated member of, the EU. Accordingly, they argue that Denmark should join the Eurozone as well as participate fully in the common security and defense policy and judicial cooperation, as well as in cooperation on asylum and immigration policy where this is compatible with Danish policy (Venstre, 2006, pp. 42–43). In the matter of labor migration, Venstre argues that the Danish labor market should be open to foreign labor that lives up to a number of objective requirements related to education and the ability to provide for oneself (Venstre, 2006, p. 10).

Venstre does not give any information concerning labor migrants' rights when working in Denmark. Considering their position that the EU should not get involved in the member states' social policy, it would appear that the party believes social rights, including welfare, should be determined by the individual member states. Moreover, their emphasis on labor immigrants' ability to provide for themselves indicates that the party is not opposed to differential treatment of labor migrants in terms of rights – suggesting a nation-based view.

### **3.3.5 The Danish Social Liberal Party**

The Danish Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre (Danmarks social-liberale parti) [B]) places their faith in free and responsible people who act in solidarity with other people. Freedom and responsibility, they argue, are inextricably linked. They underline that while society creates the framework for the individual's life and freedom, society is also dependent upon individuals fulfilling their potential, so that it can develop and be versatile. As for the society the party strives after, it is a society in which people are free to believe, think and act as they please. It is a society that is sustainable, both environmentally and economically. Moreover, they wish to strengthen democracy so that everyone has the same right and opportunity to exert influence. Democracy, they contend, presupposes that the economic and social disparity between people is not too great. Additionally, they will work to spread respect for human rights, uphold liberty of mind and fight intolerance (RV, 1997).

With reference to international commitments, the party maintains that the same principles that are valid for their policies in Denmark are valid for their international policies. They

emphasize that Denmark is a part of the global community, and that this community shares a responsibility for the global environment and resources, human rights, security and welfare. Every individual, they argue, should be secured basic social, cultural and democratic rights, regardless of ethnic background, gender, faith or governmental affiliation. Furthermore, they contend that they will work for disarmament and against isolationism, militarism and nationalism (RV, 1997).

The party's social liberal values of freedom, responsibility and solidarity are values that lend themselves well to a cosmopolitan view of identity. The party makes no mention of any notions that separates a Danish "we" from a foreign "them" in their statement of principles. Rather, they underscore tolerance and broadmindedness as values they wish to uphold. It would therefore appear that the party has a cosmopolitan view of identity, allowing for nested identities. That they consider Denmark to be a part of a global community that has a responsibility toward people everywhere, further strengthens this impression (RV, 1997).

In the matter of the EU, the party wishes to further develop the union as a binding cooperation between sovereign states (RV, 1997). In order to take full advantage of the binding and solidary community that the EU constitutes, the party argues in favor of bringing Denmark into the Union's core. The party wishes to change the Danish judicial reservation into a so-called opt-in arrangement, but in the long run they wish to do away with the judicial reservation as well as the defense and euro opt-outs (RV, 2015a). Discussing the Danish labor market, the party argues in favor of increased use of international labor. They believe foreigners who come to Denmark are a resource that must be utilized, and not a nuisance that must be avoided. They argue that talented and hard-working labor migrants are already contributing to research, development and production in Denmark, which in turn helps create work for Danes. They believe that there will be an even greater need for foreigners in the Danish labor market in the future. Accordingly, they wish to give Danish businesses the best possible conditions for recruiting international workers (RV, 2015b).

In respect of rights, the party makes no mention of social dumping. Nor do they mention whether labor migrants' working in Denmark should have the same access to welfare as Danish workers. Their positive attitude toward labor migration and their wish to make Denmark attractive to labor migrants, however, suggest that they at minimum support the view on rights found in the multinational federal model of the EU. Taking into account how the party stresses that Denmark is a part of the global community and that the same principles

that are valid for their policies in Denmark are valid for their international policies, it seems more likely that they have a cosmopolitan view on rights

### **3.3.6 The Liberal Alliance**

Denmark's Liberal Alliance (Liberal Allianse) places individual freedom first. The society they wish to create is a society characterized by open-mindedness, a society that has room for many different points of view. Humans, they argue, need elbow room. They emphasize that free individuals are different from one another, and contend that there is an intrinsic value in being allowed to seize the opportunity, to fight for personal success, and to put a mark on one's surroundings. The Liberal Alliance places the ideal of freedom over equality, and argues in favor of fewer rules and restrictions on the part of the state. A free market without undue government interference, they claim, guarantees that people can develop themselves, experiment and gain new knowledge (LA, 2015a).

With reference to open-mindedness, the Liberal Alliance contends that they believe that people should be allowed to do as they please and express themselves in many different manners. People should be allowed to seek happiness in their own way, and choose to live their lives and realize their dreams either by themselves or together with others (LA, 2015a). The party's emphasis on personal freedom and open-mindedness suggests a cosmopolitan view on identity, allowing for multi-layered, nested identities.

As for Denmark's place in the international community, the Liberal Alliance contends that they would like Denmark to be a society that is open and involved in the outside world (LA, 2015a). Concerning the EU, the party contends that the Union has developed in a negative direction where growth, progress and dialogue has been replaced by rules, bureaucracy, redistribution and centralism. For this reason, the party would like the EU to regress to what it sees as the EU's true goal – namely to ensure freedom for its citizens, business, civil society and member states. They contend that the EU should focus on developing the internal market further, and also ensure that the rules regulating the free movement of labor, goods, and services is adequately flexible. Furthermore, the party would like to abolish Denmark's opt-out from the CSDP (LA, 2013, p. 12).

The Liberal Alliance also argues that the EU should focus on the internal market and not get involved in Danish labor market policies (LA, 2013, p. 12). They contend that foreigners who

wish to contribute positively to Danish society and whose manpower is needed in the Danish labor market should be allowed to work in Denmark and feel welcome (2015a; 2013, p. 6). However, they underline that foreigners who come to Denmark must be able to provide for themselves. Denmark, they maintain, is neither able to, nor should, provide social services for “the whole world”. Accordingly, they argue that foreigners should pay for themselves the first few years that they live in Denmark and not have access to social benefits or publicly paid health care (LA, 2013, pp. 6, 12; LA, 2015a, LA, 2015b). This, in addition to the party’s position that the EU should stay out of Danish labor market policies, quite clearly indicates a view on rights that fits with the nation-based model of the EU.

### **3.3.7 The Conservative People’s Party**

The Conservative People’s Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti) describe themselves as a party of responsible people who love their native country, with its culture, traditions and history, and who wishes Denmark to be a free society where individuals take responsibility for themselves and their loved ones. The party maintains that freedom and responsibility goes hand in hand. They argue that in order to be able to take responsibility for one’s one life, one must be free to do so. For this reason, they argue in favor of less political interference in people’s day to day lives (KF, 2012, p. 8).

When discussing Danish society, the party gives great emphasis to Danish culture and institutions such as Christianity and the Danish constitution. They emphasize that today’s society is the product of millennia of history in which Danish culture has developed in interplay between internal and external influences. Denmark, they maintain, constitutes the framework for the Danish national community, culture and language. Moreover, the party argues that it is these cornerstones that allow Denmark to meet other cultures with open arms (KF, 2012, p. 9).

As to immigration, the party contends that they consider cultural integration to be just as important as economic integration. Danish traditions, they argue, constitute the culture that immigrants shall be integrated into. Accordingly, they argue that it is not enough to obey Danish law; immigrants must also have a basic understanding of Danish history, culture and language. The kind of cohesiveness this will create, they argue, will by itself contribute to greater mutual understanding. Denmark, they argue, must not become a divided society (KF, 2012, p. 27). The party’s emphasis on Danish culture, tradition and history, not least with

reference to integration policy, suggests a unitary view on identity – in which nationality is the main ingredient. There is thus little doubt that the party has a view of identity that fits into the nation-based model of the EU.

In the matter of European cooperation, the Conservative People's Party maintains that the EU is indispensable in terms of ensuring free trade between European countries and with regard to furthering common European interests toward the rest of the world. They underline that their point of departure is that the EU is a union of independent states in which the sovereignty of each nation-state is respected. With reference to decision-making, the party argues in favor of the subsidiarity principle. They are critical of what they see to be unnecessary centralization and bureaucracy, as well as the broad interpretation by the ECJ of the common EU rules (KF, 2012, p. 39).

With reference to labor migration, the Conservative People's Party holds that as a small and open society, Denmark is dependent upon foreigners coming to Denmark to contribute to the Danish society – either for a period of time or to become a permanent member of the Danish society. For this reason, the party contends that it is important to ensure an efficient processing of work permit applications for people who can prove that they are willing and able to contribute positively to the Danish society. Like the Liberal Alliance, however, they highlight that Denmark is not the world's welfare office. People who want to settle in Denmark, they argue, must be able to support themselves and their families, so as not to become a burden on the public purse (KF, 2012, p. 27). Moreover, they underline that the EU cannot and should not accommodate for all the differences in Europe in terms of public services and labor market models. In order to avoid that people come to Denmark take advantage of the Danish welfare system, they argue that Danish rules for services such as student grants and loans and child benefit must be organized in a way that prevents them from being undermined by EU regulations on inter alia workers' rights and social schemes (KF, 2015).

While the Conservative People's Party acknowledges that there are EU rules that affect EU citizens' rights when working (or studying) in Denmark, this is something that they express strong dissatisfaction with. This suggests that they would like Denmark to be free to determine foreigners' access to, and the extension of, welfare benefits. It therefore seems safe to assume that the party has a nation-based view on rights.

### 3.3.8 The Danish People's Party

The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) contends that their aim is "to assert Denmark's independence, to guarantee the freedom of the Danish people in their own country, and to preserve and promote representative government and the monarchy". The party desires "a country of free Danish citizens empowered to fend for themselves and decide their own fate. However, the state is also bound to render support to those Danes in need". In addition to a responsibility toward one another, the party contends that Danes are bound by their cultural heritage, of which the Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church, in addition to the monarchy, is an important institution. They argue that because the country is founded on Danish cultural heritage, this culture must be preserved and strengthened:

*This culture consists of the sum of the Danish people's history, experience, beliefs, language and customs. Preservation and further development of this culture is crucial to the country's survival as a free and enlightened society.*

(DF, 2002)

With reference to immigration, the Danish People's Party argues that "Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society". Moreover, they claim that "Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the lines of Danish culture". However, they contend that it ought to be possible to absorb foreigners into Danish society as long as it does not risk Danish security or democracy (DF, 2002). As for integration, the party argues that foreigners must adapt to Danish values, norms and behavior. In order for them to do so, the party argues that immigrants must be required to learn the language, get an education and contribute to society by working (2009, p. 156). Given the party's emphasis on Danish culture and resistance to immigration, as well as their thoughts on integration, it is clear that the party supports the view on identity found in the nation-based model of the EU – namely that nationality provides the main source of people's identities.

As regards Europe, the Danish People's Party supports an open and democratic cooperation between free and independent countries in Europe. The party does not, however, support any attempts at creating a European federation (which they argue has been the objective of the existing EU treaties). The party therefore wishes Denmark to keep the four Danish opt-outs. Moreover, they argue that EU functions should be restricted to the following: tasks that large

majorities in the member states believes should be solved through the EU, tasks whose transnational nature necessitates common solutions, and tasks for which there are decisive economy of scale for common solutions (DF, 2009, p. 60).

The Danish People's Party does not discuss labor migration within the EU specifically. Generally, they have a restrictive attitude on the import of labor. They underline that immigration and welfare are inextricably linked, and that there are enormous costs connected with the uncontrolled immigration of foreigners that are either unable to or unwilling to contribute to society. They argue that should immigration prove to be beneficial to the Danish and not only put extra pressure on public spending (like heretofore), it is imperative that the migrants exhibit the behavior of and meet the same requirements as Danes. The party is, however, positive toward controlled immigration of educated, talented people who come to Denmark to work. These people, they argue, contribute to the development of the Danish welfare state, and not to the impoverishment of the country (DF, 2009, pp. 136, 156). Given the party's restrictive view on immigration combined with their skepticism toward the EU, it seems probable that they support a nation-based view on rights – allowing member states to determine for themselves who has access to, as well as the extension of, welfare.

### **3.3.9 The Alternative**

The Alternative (Alternativet) is a political party whose focus is on the sustainable transition of Denmark. This transition, they argue, “is characterized by the courage to imagine a radically different future, both for Denmark and for the rest of the world”. The Alternative wishes for a transition that is at once environmentally, socially and economically sustainable.

*The time for stop-gap measures is over. Minor adjustments and the treatment of symptoms are no longer enough. What we need instead are new forms of cooperation, new decision-making processes and a new approach to the allocation of global resources, where economic growth and material consumption are no longer the goal of everything. The Alternative is therefore seeking to redefine the established perception of welfare and value.*

*(Alternativet, 2013)*

The party contends that the world is in need of nations that take sustainable transitions seriously and that leads the way for vibrant, creative and inclusive societies. This, they argue, is the society of the future. They contend that “Sustainability is about being wise. It is about



long-term thinking and taking responsibility through action. It is about respect and cooperation between people and nature, as well as amongst people” (A, 2013).

With reference to social sustainability, the Alternative sees diversity and variation as societal advantages. They believe that “people are at their best when they are motivated, engaged, and have the opportunity to develop their talents and make a difference without having to compromise [sic] who they are”. Because they believe different people want to live different lives, they wish to build a society that responds to diversity. Moreover, they would like all people to be able to achieve a good life, and contend that “human well-being is fundamental for a socially sustainable society” (A, 2013).

It is clear that the Alternative has a cosmopolitan view on identity. Considering that they believe diversity to be beneficial for society, and that people should be allowed to be who they are, suggests an attitude that allows for multiple, nested identities. Furthermore, their wish to lead a sustainable transition not only in Denmark, but also in the world, suggests that they consider themselves as humans belonging to the global community. They make no mention of any notions that can be interpreted as purely Danish and there is no separation of a “we” from a “them”. As a recently established party, the Alternative makes no mention of labor migration. Given their extremely open attitude towards all humans and the world, however, it seems fair to assume that they would also hold a cosmopolitan view on rights.

### **3.3.10 Summary**

A comparison of the Danish political parties (table 5) reveals that while six parties have a cosmopolitan view on identity, nearly as many (four) have a nation-based view. However, two of the parties with a cosmopolitan view on identity – the Social Democrats and the Liberal Alliance – place in the multinational federal and the nation-based model when it comes to rights. The Liberal Alliance is a particularly interesting case, as the party has a cosmopolitan view on identity but a nation-based view on rights. The Social Democrats express a grudging acceptance of the EU setting the rules for labor migrants’ rights, and is consequently placed in the multinational federal dimension on rights. The remaining seven parties all show an inner consistency in terms of placement on the two dimensions.

As regards whether welfare migration is perceived to be a problem or not, a majority of Danish parties (the Red-Green Alliance, the Social Democrats, the Liberal Alliance, the

Conservative People's Party and the Danish People's Party) express concern that welfare migration poses a threat to the Danish welfare system. While three of these parties have a nation-based view on rights, the two others have a multinational federal and a cosmopolitan view on rights. The Red-Green Alliance also expresses concern for social dumping as a result of the free flow of labor within the EU, but social dumping is discussed in a manner that suggests that they consider it to be primarily a problem for Danish workers who might lose their jobs to underpaid foreign workers from Eastern Europe. The Socialist People's Party is the only other party that discusses problems of social dumping, and they appear to be doing so with the labor migrants' well-being in mind.

**Table 4:** Danish political parties' placement on the identity and rights dimensions

	<b>Nation-based Model</b>	<b>Multinational Federal Model</b>	<b>Cosmopolitan Model</b>
<b>Identity</b>	Conservative People's Party Danish People's Party Venstre		Red-Green Alliance Socialist People's Party The Alternative Social Democrats Danish Social Liberal Party Liberal Alliance
<b>Rights</b>	Liberal Alliance Conservative People's Party Danish People's Party Venstre	Social Democrats	Red-Green Alliance Socialist People's Party The Alternative Danish Social Liberal Party

As the only party that explicitly states that they are against Danish membership in the EU and would like the EU to be dismantled, the Red-Green Party nonetheless have a cosmopolitan view on both dimensions.

### 3.4 Concluding Remarks

The foregoing analysis has been aimed at answering the research question, namely which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Scandinavia, and which model of the EU these perceptions reflect. With reference to the first part of the question, the analysis has shown that there exists a scale related to the problem definition of welfare migration within the context of the EU/EEA: At one end of the scale, welfare migration is seen to be a challenge to national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the

other end of the scale, welfare migration is not considered a problem at all. Instead, labor migration within the EU/EEA is seen to be problematic because it threatens workers' rights and leads to social dumping.

The above analysis has also shown that this scale of concern for welfare migration at one end and concern for social dumping at the other corresponds with the scale made up by the three models, with the nation-based model at one end, the multinational federal model in the middle, and the cosmopolitan model at the other end. The parties that are most concerned about welfare induced migration and its effects on national welfare systems are also the parties that most strongly express a nation-based (in some cases a multinational federal) view on identity and rights. Similarly, the parties that most strongly express cosmopolitan views on the two dimensions are also the parties that are concerned about labor migrants being subjected to poor wages and working conditions.

There are some rather significant differences between the three countries regarding whether welfare migration is perceived to be a problem or not. While there is the above-mentioned trend in terms of model placement and concern for welfare induced migration vs. social dumping, it is clear that the issue of welfare migration is not of the same interest in the three countries. While there are three parties in Norway and five parties in Denmark voicing concerns about labor migrants' misuse of national systems of welfare, there is only one Swedish party expressing concern about this. In both Norway and Denmark there are also parties placing in the cosmopolitan model on both dimensions (the Labour Party and the Liberal Party in Norway, and the Red-Green Alliance), but nonetheless express concern about labor migration affecting the sustainability of the welfare state. This suggests that welfare migration is perceived to be less of an issue in Sweden than in Norway and Denmark.

With reference to social dumping, all Norwegian parties placing within the cosmopolitan model express concern that labor migrants from the EEA suffer from wages and working conditions that are not on par with that of the Norwegian labor market standards. In Sweden, it is the three parties that place within the cosmopolitan model on both dimensions that express concern about social dumping. In Denmark it is really only one party that expresses a concern for social dumping (in terms of having an adverse effect on labor migrants' living circumstances, as opposed to having an adverse effect on Danish workers who might lose their jobs), namely the Socialist People's Party – also placing within the cosmopolitan model on both dimensions. While welfare migration appears to be less of an issue in Sweden,

concerns about social dumping is just as important in Sweden as in Norway. Social dumping is, however, less of an issue in Denmark, where concerns about welfare migration on the whole appear to be more important.

As regards the second part of the research question, which views on welfare migration the existing perceptions of welfare migration reflects, there are some significant differences between the three countries (see table 6 below). The cosmopolitan view on identity dominates in both Norway and Sweden. In Denmark, the parties' views on identity are more evenly divided between the cosmopolitan and the nation-based model. The multinational federal view on identity is the least common, supporting the no-demos theorists' argument that there is no common European people. However, when parties do express a multinational federal view on either identity or rights, they often give emphasis to common European values or history. In the same vein, the parties expressing a nation-based view on identity and rights often use arguments that reveal a classical understanding of citizenship – namely that democracy is only possible within the nation-state. The parties expressing cosmopolitan views are in general less concerned with identity, and more with equality, both in terms of worth and with regard to rights.

In terms of parties' inner consistency with regard to placement on the two dimensions, there is a noticeable difference between the three countries. While all parties in Norway place in the same model on both dimensions, there are four parties in Sweden and two parties in Denmark that place differently on the two dimensions. A common denominator between these parties are that they all express a more open and tolerant view on identity than on rights. The parties are all also for Swedish and Danish EU membership. This difference in placement on the two dimensions could reflect a desire to appear more open and tolerant than they in fact are. That there is more consistency among Norwegian political parties could be due to the fact that Norway is not a member of the EU. It could also be due to the fact that Norwegian parties publish political programs consisting of both values and desired political actions at the same time (i.e. before parliamentary elections), and it is primarily these documents that are analyzed here.

A small puzzle is related to the parties that place in the cosmopolitan model on both dimensions, but that nonetheless are against EU membership. A plausible explanation for this could be that these parties believe the social dimension of the EU to be underdeveloped and that their populations would suffer from membership in the EU. As for the parties placing

within the multinational federal model on the rights dimension, there is some indication that several of these parties are willing to accept that labor migrants' are given access to welfare because they are committed to European cooperation through the EU/EEA.

**Table 5:** Scandinavian political parties' placement on the identity and rights dimensions

		<b>Nation-based Model</b>	<b>Multinational Federal Model</b>	<b>Cosmopolitan Model</b>
<b>NORWAY</b>	<b>Identity</b>	Centre Party (Sp) Progress Party (Frp)	Conservative Party (H)	Socialist Left Party (SV) Labour Party (Ap) Christian Democratic Party (KrF) Liberal Party (V) Green Party (MDG)
	<b>Rights</b>	Centre Party (Sp) Progress Party (Frp)	Conservative Party (H)	Socialist Left Party (SV) Labour Party (Ap) Christian Democratic Party (KrF) Liberal Party (V) Green Party (MDG)
<b>SWEDEN</b>	<b>Identity</b>	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Christian Democrats (KD)	Left Party (V) Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) Green Party (MD) Centre Party (C) Liberal People's Party (FP) Moderate Party (M)
	<b>Rights</b>	Sweden Democrats (SD)	Centre Party (C) Liberal People's Party (FP) Moderate Party (M) Christian Democrats (KD)	Left Party (V) Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) Green Party (MD)
<b>DENMARK</b>	<b>Identity</b>	Conservative People's Party Danish People's Party Venstre		Red-Green Alliance Socialist People's Party The Alternative Social Democrats Danish Social Liberal Party Liberal Alliance
	<b>Rights</b>	Liberal Alliance Conservative People's Party Danish People's Party Venstre	Social Democrats	Red-Green Alliance Socialist People's Party The Alternative Danish Social Liberal Party

In this study, placement on the rights dimension is considered to more accurately reflect a party's perception of welfare migration. This is because the rights dimension is directly related to a party's thoughts on labor immigration and the policies they accordingly wish to pursue. Analyzing all parties' placement with this in mind, it is still the cosmopolitan model that dominates in Norway. In Sweden, however, there are now as many parties expressing a multinational federal view as a cosmopolitan view. In Denmark, no one model dominates, as the parties are evenly divided between the cosmopolitan and the nation-based model, with only one party expressing a multinational federal view.

With a view to explain these differences, it is natural to consider the three countries' affiliation with the EU. Given that Norway is not a member, Denmark is a member but holds several important opt-outs, and Sweden is a fully integrated member, one could expect Norwegian parties to be the most concerned about welfare migration, Swedish parties to be the least concerned, and Danish parties to be somewhere in-between. While form of affiliation could be a plausible explanation for Swedish parties' placements (with more Swedish parties placing in the multinational federal model as Sweden is fully integrated in the EU) as well as the Swedish disregard for welfare migration, it does not explain why the cosmopolitan model dominates in Norway. Nor does it account for Danish parties' placement in the models or the outspread concern for welfare migration found among Danish parties. These differences do, however, reflect the general debate on immigration, as well as immigration policies (in terms of openness vs. closedness), in the three countries.

## 4 Conclusions

This thesis has taken the ongoing European discussion on welfare migration as its starting point. It is a debate that is particularly interesting because there is uncertainty among researchers whether welfare actually *is* a determinant of migration within the EU/EEA. Consequently, there is ample opportunity for parties to color the concept of welfare migration according to their fundamental political beliefs. This study has had an exploratory objective - it has sought to discover, map and describe the perceptions of welfare migration that exist among political parties in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. As such, it has been a first attempt at understanding the ideas and perceptions that come to the fore in one of the major debates of our day.

A number of insights have been gained from the analysis. With reference to the first part of the thesis – which perceptions of welfare migration exist and dominate among political parties in Scandinavia – the study has revealed that there exists a scale related to the problem definition of welfare migration. At one end of the scale, welfare migration is indeed considered a challenge to national welfare systems and their sustainability. At the other end of the scale, welfare migration is not considered a problem at all. Rather, labor migration within the EU/EEA is seen as problematic because it threatens workers' rights and leads to social dumping. The analysis has also shown that this scale corresponds with the continuum made up of the three models of the EU utilized in this thesis, with the nation-based model at one end, the multinational federal model in the middle, and the cosmopolitan model at the other end. The general pattern is that the parties that are the most concerned about welfare induced migration are the parties that most strongly express a nation-based (in some cases a multinational federal) view on identity and rights, whereas the parties that are most concerned about social dumping are the parties that most strongly express a cosmopolitan view on identity and rights.

There are, however, some significant differences between the three countries. While all the Norwegian and Swedish parties that communicate a cosmopolitan view on identity and rights express concerns about social dumping, only two out of four Danish parties placing in the cosmopolitan model on both dimensions express similar concerns. With reference to concerns about welfare migration, the image is a little less clear, and there is more variation between the three countries. While all Norwegian parties placing in the nation-based and the

multinational federal model of the EU express concerns about the effects of intra-EU migration on national welfare systems, there are also a couple of parties placing within the cosmopolitan model that express similar concerns (although in less strong terms). The pattern in Denmark is similar, with most parties placing in the nation-based and the multinational federal models, as well as one party placing in the cosmopolitan model, voicing concerns about welfare induced migration. In Sweden, however, only one party (placing within the multinational federal model) expresses concerns about the sustainability of national welfare systems as a result of intra-EU migration. This suggests that welfare migration is less of an issue in Sweden than in the two other countries.

With reference to the second part of the research question – which model best reflects the parties' perceptions of welfare migration – the study has also provided some interesting insights. While the Norwegian parties show inner consistency in placing in the same model on both dimensions, a number of Swedish and Danish parties place differently on the two dimensions. This might be due to a desire to appear more open than they in fact are, perhaps explained by the fact that Sweden and Denmark are members of the EU whereas Norway is not. In this study, placement on the rights dimension is considered to be a more accurate reflection of the parties' perceptions of welfare migration – as this dimension is directly related to the policies the parties wish to pursue with reference to labor immigrants. Comparing the three countries looking only at placement on the rights dimension, the cosmopolitan model dominates in Norway, the multinational federal and the cosmopolitan models are equally dominating in Sweden, whereas the nation-based and the cosmopolitan model are the two dominating models in Denmark.

Form of affiliation with the EU does not appear to fully account for the differences between the three countries with regard to which model dominate and which perceptions of welfare migration are the most prevalent. Given that Norway is not a member, Denmark is a member but holds several important opt-outs, and Sweden is a fully integrated member, one would expect Norwegian parties to be the most concerned about welfare migration, Swedish parties to be the least concerned, and Danish parties to be somewhere in-between. This is not the case, as Denmark is the country in which most parties express concerns about welfare migration, and also the country in which the nation-based model is the most important.

While form of affiliation could explain why more Swedish than Danish and Norwegian parties place within the multinational federal model and why welfare migration is less of an



issue in Sweden than in the other two countries, it does not account for the importance of the nation-based model in Denmark or the fact that concerns about welfare migration are more strongly expressed in Denmark than in Norway. The widespread concern for welfare migration in Denmark might, however, be due to the country being a “euroskeptic” within the Union. That the Danish people favor intergovernmentalism over supranationalism was made obvious upon the creation of the EU, when the Danish people rejected the Maastricht Treaty and Denmark subsequently obtained four opt-outs from the EU – all of which pertain to central aspects linked to the autonomy and sovereignty of the nation-state. When Norway entered into the EEA Agreement, on the other hand, the Norwegian people had to accept the foundation of the EEA (i.e. the four freedoms), but did not have to take a stance on the Maastricht Treaty or any following treaties.

One thing that has become clear from the analysis is that all perceptions of welfare migration – whether construed as a threat to the sustainability of national welfare systems or as a threat to workers’ rights – are expressions of the challenge that the EU poses. EU citizenship, with its accompanying supranational rights, challenges not only national institutions and sovereignty, but also national feelings of political community and citizenship. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU in combination with the right to move and reside freely within the EU/EEA (and to not be discriminated on the basis of nationality), has brought this question of inclusiveness vs. exclusiveness to the forefront of political debates.

The parties’ placement in the three different models of the EU says something about how open or closed they wish their national communities to be, both in terms of inclusion in the community and in terms of access to rights. While parties placing within the nation-based model signal unwillingness for further European integration in the EU, parties placing in the multinational federal model are more open and positive toward European integration through the EU. Parties placing in the cosmopolitan model are arguably the most open. There are, however, a number of parties that express cosmopolitan views, but nonetheless oppose EU membership. A plausible explanation could be that these parties are not against European integration *per se*, but rather that they are against how European integration is currently being pursued in the EU. The challenge that the EU and EU citizenship poses to these parties, is related to the social welfare of their country’s citizens.

While a number of insights have been gained from this study, there are still many questions left unanswered. This thesis has been a first attempt at mapping the existing perceptions of

welfare migration in Scandinavia, and as such has laid the groundwork for further examination. In future studies, it would be interesting to broaden the scope by including other types of documents, as well as analyze documents from different points in time. Since party platforms are standardized documents expressing a party's official opinion on a topic, it might be interesting to look at less formal documents, such as parliamentary debates, to see if the parties' perceptions of welfare migration remain the same. One might also take the analysis out of the purely political sphere and investigate public opinion as expressed in the media. A natural future step would also be to examine how different perceptions of welfare migration affect policy.

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